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Spruille  Braden  is  an  enigmatic  figure  who has  not  been 
widely studied by historians.     In fact no serious studies 
have appeared on the analysis of his career.     Braden'a Mem- 
oirs are  available to  the  public»  however,   they  must   be 
read cautiously.    The Memoirs contain no documentation and 
its veracity  should, unfortunately,  be questioned often. 
Perhaps  part of the problem involvea the fact  that the 
author published the Memoirs in his seventy-seventh year. 
Despite this handicap there is a plentiful supply of pri- 
mary sources by Braden which are readily accessible. 
Braden was a very flamboyant ambassador in the  1930's 
and  1940's.    He built the reputation of being tough,  dedi- 
cated,  intelligent and hard  working.     He also proved to be 
an invaluable   asset  to  his  country  in  the  years  before and 
during World War II.    Braden was considered a  liberal and 
a progressive  and  a  strong advocate  of Franklin  D.  Roose- 
velt's Good  Neighbor  Polloy.     Braden   served  his  last ambassa- 
dorship in Argentina in 1945.    It lasted nearly five months 
sfter which he was brought to Washington and made Assistant 
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.    While in 
the capital Braden became more and more e virtual anony- 
mous figure in the State Department.    After less than two 
years at this post he resigned; his robust pride would not 
3 J 
allow Mo  to  continue  In   such a  role.     Bra dec  spent  the 
following years reacting against what he felt was a com- 
munist  conspiracy against  him emanating from  the  State 
Department.    Over the coming years he evolved into an 
arch-conservative which gave rise to his enigmatic char- 
acter. 
The purpose of this monograph is to show what caused 
Braden's transition from left to right.    His speeches and 
his career are thoroughly analyzed so as to discover the 
salients that comprise the dues to the unraveling of his 
nature. 
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CHAPTER I 
SPRUILLE BRADEN:     AN INTRODUCTION 
Spruille Braden served ID the United States State 
Department from 1933 through 1947*    During most of those 
14 years he oerried  the oredentials of ambassador to various 
Latin Aoerioan  republics.     Braden proved during those years 
to be a ohampion of Democracy and a battler against  faaclsm. 
He was also a proponent of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy 
in the years before and during World War II.     In those years 
he had the reputation of being e progressive and a liberal, 
but then in 1945 he went to Washington to beoooe Assistant 
Secretary of  State  for  Latin American sffairs.     In less  than 
two years he was to resign from the State Department bitter 
snd  totally  disillusioned.     He  wes to  spend  much of his 
remaining life reaotlng against the unhappy tine he spent in 
Washington.     He beosme an arch-conservative and abandoned 
many of his political beliefs of previous years.     The goal 
of this projeot la to explain Braden's evolution from lib- 
eral to conservative. 
There has been only one book written about Spruille 
Braden. Diplomata snd Demagogues is the memoirs of the 
former smbassador.    Although it la used extensively herein, 
it is not s totally reliable souroe in that there ere many 
notable omissions in its text.    These omissions  speak poig- 
nantly of Braden more so than all the material that la 
included; for in his memoirs Braden likes to dwell on the 
happier times.     It is beoause of this the memoirs are not 
very valuable but they are widely uaed to fill ID informa- 
tion gaps.     Other sources of information inolude the Sew 
York Times which has nearly 400 articles on Braden.    The 
rest of the source material is derived from magazines,   jour- 
nals, history books and United States documents.     Forty-five 
of these  sources are speeches or articles written by 
Spruille Braden whioh comprise  one-third of the total num- 
ber.    In a monograph whose purpose is  to traoe the ideolog- 
ical dynamics that caused Braden'I transition from left to 
right it is essential that one rely on the man's thoughts 
and words.     In this respect there is an abundance of pri- 
mary sources. 
Spruille Braden was born March 13, 1894,  in a log oabln 
at a mining oamp in Elkhorn, Montana.    William and Mary 
Braden had been in Elkhorn in connection with William Bra- 
den 's profession of mining engineer.     Spruille was to spend 
his early years  following his  parents  from Elkhorn  to New 
York City to Mexico and then St. Catherines,  Ontario, where 
at the age of nine Spruille first went to sohool.    A year 
later the Bradeca moved to Santiago, Chile.    William Braden 
had acquired a small fortune in the years since Spruille's 
birth.    He was to make a greater fortune mining oopper  in 
Chile. 
In 1910 at the age of 16 Spruille Braden qualified to 
enter the Sheffield Scientific Sohool at Yale Univeraityi 
in  1914  he  graduated  with a   Ph.B.   in nine  engineering.     Dur- 
ing his junior and senior years at Yale, Braden distinguished 
himself as an all-American goalie on the water polo team. 
Incidentally a   teammate  of his  was  the  poet  Archibald 
MaoLeish.    After graduation Spruille returned to Chile  to 
work with his  father.     He had gained  praotioal experience 
from his father before he entered Yale and during summers 
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which he spent at the mines sway from sohool. 
Soon after returning to Chile Braden went to work for 
the Andes Exploration Company which had been formed by the 
Anaoonda Company and William Braden in order to locate, 
acquire and develop untapped sources of ore.    He began as 
an engineer and assistant general manager and in 1916 
ascended to acting manager.    He also held  the same position 
for the Santiago Mining Company and during World War I was 
the President of the Red Cross Society of Chile.    He slso 
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was to become president of the American Society of Chile. 
In 1921 as President and Director of the Bolivia-Argen- 
tina Exploration Company the 27-year-old Braden negotiated 
for and oontraoted to buy 5,320,000 acres of Bolivian land 
for the purpose of drilling for oil.     In aoquiring the Boliv- 
ian land for his oompany he revealed that British and German 
interests gave him stiff oompetition in the negotiations 
for  "perhaps one of the highest grades of oil ever found." 
Later in 1921,  Standard Oil of Hew Jersey acquired the oil 
fields from the Bradens.       This ooup by the young Braden 
was preceded by a few days with another financial prise in 
competition with Germany over the electrification of the 
Chilean railroad system. The entire operstion would oost 
$10,000,000 and the oontreot waa secured by Spruille Braden 
with Messrs. Srrasuris, Simpson snd Company for Weatinghouse 
Electric International Company, who would be responsible 
for the electrification of the railroad.  This contract 
aooording to Braden represented the largest "railroad elec- 
trification oontraot in the world sinoe the beginning of 
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the wer in 1914." 
Braden made a fortune in latin America during the 
years after 1918.    He reoeived many commissions as financial 
advisor to several Latin American countries besides the com- 
missions he reoeived from the mining snd ezplorstion com- 
panies. 
Braden next came to the United States and purchased 
control of the Monmouth Rug Mills in New Jersey snd made 
changes that developed it into a lucrative business.    He 
was also to beoome an official in several large companies. 
In 1920 he was asked to beoome a delegate to the aeoond 
Fan-American finanoial oonferenoe because of his knowledge 
of things monetary.     In 1932 he established  the Rehabili- 
tation Corporation which assisted  potentially profitable 
6 
enterprises. 
By the time Spruille Braden srrived in the United States 
he was probably a millionaire.    In Ootober of 1922, one year 
after the conclusion of the Bolivian oil field  transaction, 
Braden and his wife Maria  (Braden oat and married Maria 
Humeres Solar in Chile in 1915) moved into the Stonehurat 
eetete,   Just outside New York City,  after  Sprullle purchased 
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it for $200,000.      Braden waa to continue to be a auooeaaful 
businessman until after  the  orash of 1929*     Braden remained, 
relatively speaking,  politically unaware until the ege of 30. 
In the eleotion of 1924 he voted Democratic for the flrat 
tine,   although he waa  a  registered  Republican.     He ezpleined 
his  lack  of political  awareness with the   statement:     "Like 
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moat young people,  I had inherited my party affiliation." 
It waa not until the eleotion of 1928 that Braden registered 
aa a Democrat.    At this point he oould delineate aoourately 
the party whose principles most closely resembled his own 
sentiments.     In 1928 Braden voted for Al Smith and publicly 
expressed his reasons.    He listed ten,  the most significant 
of which was Smith's stand aa an anti-prohibitionist since 
9 
prohibition only led to an increase in orlme. 
In 1931 Braden returned to Chile for a visit during a 
time when revolution wes a palpable threat.    He wea ques- 
tioned aa to the possibility that Chile might become com- 
munistic.     He answered:     "There  is no danger  of Chile  going 
Communist,  and even if by some combination of oiroumstsnoes 
a soviet government should be set up aa a result of the 
10 
present disturbances,  it oould not last."        He went on to 
point out that there was little class difference in Chile, 
that  there had  been a  signif!cent   leveling off.     He  then 
naively gave an example of the closeness of the olaaaea. 
"Where there used to be many beautiful cars,  on this trip I 
11 
saw  only one  old  Rolls-Royce." At a  time  of depression, 
suoh aa exlated in Chile, everyone suffers but to peasants 
even an old Rolls-Royce would be a  symbol of the real dif- 
ference in the olaaaea.    Aa late aa 1945 Braden would admit 
to ignoranoe about Communism.    After 1947 he would over- 
compensate for that  ignoranoe. 
William and Spruille Braden had invested heavily in the 
stock market but anticipated  the crash and  sold a good deel 
of their stocks before it actually occurred and were aaved 
from loaing everything| however, they re-invested in the 
market prematurely, after which the value of their etooka 
plummeted and they barely eaoaped bankruptcy.    The Bradena 
were not totally ruined; they both possessed exceptional 
finanoial expertise and their aervicea were in demand ao 
12 
they got by without further difficulty. Spruille Braden 
waa not tied to any obligations and  ao weloomed an interest- 
ing change.     The change oame early in 1933. 
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CHAPTER II 
MONTEVIDEO TO BUENOS AIRESt 
AN AMBASSADORIAL CAREER BEGINS 
Early in the year 1933, Spruille Braden pondered new 
beginnings.  He casually asked a dinner guest what he 
should do next.  The dinner guest, Benjamin Cohen, was the 
United Statea Charge d'Affairs to Chile. Cohan suggested 
to Braden he try diplomacy and offered that the embassy in 
Chile waa now vacant.  Spruille and Maria Braden waxed 
enthuaiaatio as Maria waa a native of Chile. Braden had sev- 
eral friends who were adviaors to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. He spoke to them and they were supportive of the 
idea. Homer Cumminge and William Woodin spoke to the Presi- 
dent and to Cordell Hull, the Seoretary of State. The Pres- 
ident had been reminded that Braden had made a notable con- 
tribution to his 1928 campaign. Woodin and Cumminga in- 
formed the President and Seoretary of State of Braden'a 
ability and background in Latin American affairs and more 
particularly with his oloae tiea to Chile. The President 
waa suitably impressed and promised the Chilean embassy to 
Braden. Braden waa amazed aa to how such things oame aboutf 
but if Braden waa awed by the manner in which he aeemed to 
have become a diplomat he must have bean equally dismayed 
a few weeka later when he received a telephone oall saying 
that he was out aa ambassador  to Chile.    Aa it turned out 
politioal patronage ooat Braden the post,     vice President 
John Nanoe Garner owed a politioal favor in Ms native state 
of Texas and thus Henry Sevier became ambassador to Chile. 
A few months later Braden received a far more realiatio 
appointment for a beginning diplomat.    He waa aeleoted to be 
a delegate to the Seventh International Conferenoe of 
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American States which would be held in Montevideo, Uruguay. 
What was known aa the Montevideo Conferenoe would meet from 
December 3 to December 23,  1933.    The American delegation waa 
led by Cordell Hull.     There were many issues  to be preaented 
and debated.    Some of the more noteworthy issues involved 
Cordell Hull's explanation of the new administration'a policy 
2 
called  the   "Good  Neighbor."       The  Pan  American  republics 
aought and exacted a  non-interventionist promise  from the 
United States in regard to latin American affairs.      And 
toward the close of the three-week oonferenoe Spruille 
Braden delivered a  speech at the personal request of Presi- 
dent Roosevelt.     It oonoerned the President's preparations 
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to abandon gold  aa  the  standard  for  American   dollars.       In 
hia memoirs,  Braden atated he sided with the Preaidant on the 
gold issue though he later changed hia mindt     "I had been ao 
impressed by the apeotaole of values wiped out during the 
depression that I fell for the idea of aubstltuting govern- 
ment monetary controls for the automatio braking effeot of 
the gold  standard....The President deoided I should make the 
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speech.     It bad a   remarkably  aoothing  effect  on  tbe  assem- 
bled  delegations,   and  I was  vindicated.     Today  I an  thor- 
oughly aabamed of tbat   speech.     I believe   tbe abandonment  of 
the gold atandard waa morally wrong.     It was an economic 
blunder tbat deprived the American people of their right to 
a redeemable currency,  aomething strongly opposed by the 
Socialists and  Communists."       At this  point Braden makes an 
ominous comment concerning tbe more reoent peat and written 
from the  perspective   of 1971.     "Yet  today auppoaedly  respon- 
sible bankers oppose our return to the gold  atandard and 
even advocate doing away with our gold  oertifloate re- 
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serve." 
Aooording to  Braden  the  most  notable  result of tbe  Mon- 
tevideo Conference waa the improving,  on tbe whole,  of 
inter-American  relations.     He  attributes  a  great  deal of 
this success to tbe efforts of Cordell Hull.    Hull's atti- 
tude revealed en honest,  eincere and friendly person to Latin 
Americana end  this attitude  went e   long wey in  oreeting e 
freer trade among Western Hemisphere  nations.     Had he  tried 
to reduce tariffs unilaterally beck home be moot oertainly 
would have met with defeet.    But tbe mandate Hull received 
at tbe Seventh Inter-American  Conference  indicated  e hemis- 
pheric willingness to reduce protective tariffs,  thus asking 
bis taak back in tbe states more palatable to tbe Congress. 
While in Montevideo Hull bad to deal with Carloa 
Saevedra  Lamas who waa expected to make things difficult 
for  tbe American  delegation from his   post  of Minister  of 
11 
Foreign Affairs for Argentina.    Argentina's main export was 
beef, a product which traveled almost exclusively to Great 
Britain.     The Argentines felt no great need to ingratiate 
themselves with the Americana and so were expeoted to be 
8 
troublesome.       Saavedra Lamas was a vain and ambitious man 
but he also had ability,  a   necessary  complement  for  the 
other two characteristics.     As expeoted, when the conference 
convened the Argentine minister began to be troublesome. 
Hull approached him and offered a bargain.    In return for 
Saavedra  Lamaa'  supporting Hull's programs,  the Secretary of 
State would endorse his anti-war pact and back him in seek- 
ing an end  to hostilities between Paraguay and Bolivia in 
the contesting of the land known as the Chaoo Boreal.    The 
bargain was made and Argentina oeased to be a thorn in 
the side of the United States delegation. 
Braden said that the anti-war pact lacked originality. 
He cited the Gondra treaty which was ratified at the Inter- 
Amerioan Conference at Santiago, Chile,  in 1923 and  the 
Kellogg Fact of 1928 as having precedence in such matters. 
Saavedra Lamas'  lack of originality kept several nations 
from endorsing the pact oallicg it  "silly."    But Hull saw 
the advantage that might be gained by endorsing the redun- 
dant pact.     He exchanged his aupport of the innocuous anti- 
war pact for  the acceptance  of a meaningful commercial pol- 
9 
ioy for the hemisphere.      Ironically,  the anti-war paot was 
a contributory factor in Saavedra Lamas' winning the Nobel 
peace prize a few yeara later. 
12 
The Chaoo dispute wee en issue worthy of immediate 
concern end   settlement.     The  conflict  between  Paraguay end 
Bolivie ley over the Cheoo Boreel.    Efforts to settle the 
dispute begen in 1879.    From 1887 through 1927 four major 
efforts et arbitration were made,   ell ending in  failure. 
In 1932 e bloody,  savage end oostly war broke out between 
the  disputants.     Most of  Latin  America  wanted e  oessstion 
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of hostilities.        When Argentine, through the person of 
Saavedra   Lamas  sought,   through the auspices  of the  Pen 
American Conference,  e finsl settlement between the two 
countries,  it was not entirely for selfless purposes. 
Argentine  was  the  primary  foreign  investor  in  Paraguayan 
propertiee;  thus Saavedra  Lamas was not ezeotly pleeding the 
altruistic concerns of Argentine et Montevideo.    Before the 
Montevideo Conferenoe came  to en end  the member nations 
errenged en 18-day cease-fire  between Paraguay end Bolivie. 
Fighting wee to resume end continue for another yeer end e 
half.     The oonferenoe olosed on December 26, three deys 
lster then plenned, end the outcome was termed e success. 
In  1934  Spruille  Breden  remained   fairly ineotive  in 
Stete Department work.    Brsden wee named a delegete to the 
twenty-first Nstionsl Foreign Trede Convention whioh was 
held in New York City from October 13 through November 2, 
1934.     He  spoke on the  topio   "Inter-American  Commercial 
12 
Arbitration:    A Working Plan."        In his speeoh Breden 
pointed out that  international relations had beoome more 
involved with trade and finenoe et the expense of the 
11 
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formerly predominant political issues.     He went on to sayt 
"The misunderstandings and  disputes now  prevailing between 
the peoples of the world largely will be found to grow out 
13 
of oetter8  relating to trade and  finance." Making a  set- 
tlement  of a  commercial  claim  involving  the  laws of two 
nations oould prove to be lengthy and  costly.    As an altern- 
ative  to  the  legal approach,   Braden  offered  the   standardi- 
zation of arbitration law throughout the hemisphere.     He 
pointed out that an  interest in international arbitration, 
within the hemisphere, had a  long history, citing the  first 
Fan American  Conference  in  1826 and   the   first  Fan  American 
Financial Congreas in 1913. 
The  outstanding feature   of  Inter-American  arbitration 
would be  that the partiea who undertook to go through the 
process would waive the right of appeal and the arbiter*s 
decision would be binding.     This would eliminate the need 
for contesting an unpopular decision,  on the behalf of one 
party within the courta, which would only serve  to destroy 
the  original intent  of the   Inter-American  Commercial Arbi- 
tration  Commission's goal of a  speedy and fair   justice. 
Braden proudly added that although the arbitration 
commission does not officially belong within the auspices 
of the United  States Department of State,  it is consistent 
with the President and Secretary of State*s program of the 
Good Neighbor Policy.    Before the end of Braden*a apeech 
he urged that the nations of South, Central and North Amerioa 
14 
impress upon  the  businessmen  of their  countries  to include 
the   "arbitration  clause" within ell written oontrsots. 
Braden's address in New York City in 1934 would not be his 
14 
last enoounter with commercial arbitration. 
The next year,  1935* proved to be a very busy one for 
Spruille Braden,  particularly the last two-thirds of the 
year.    The Pan American Commercial Conferenoe was to meet 
in Buenos  Aires  on May  6.     Braden was  to be  second  in  com- 
mand of the American delegation.    Unofficially, he was the 
de facto leader.    Alexander Weddell as ambassador to Argen- 
tina had to be named delegation chairman.    Weddell knew 
little about commerce and less about Spanish.    He was glad 
to let Braden have the controls since he would have to deal 
with Carlos Saavedra Lamas,  the Argentine Foreign Minister. 
The Pan American Commercial Conference proved very suc- 
cessful.     It ran from May 6 through June 29,  1935.    During 
that time more than 50 issues became resolutions or agree- 
ments; some of greater and some of lesser importance.     One 
important issue oonoerned the defining of "immigrant." 
When the topic came up Braden said:     "This word is defined 
by law in the United States,  and we will aocept no other 
definition."        Braden asked for and reoeived permission to 
translate into Spanish the United States version of "immi- 
grant."    When it was time to deoide the definition the dele- 
gates were at a  loss.    Braden suggested that they first try 
to deoide what an immigrant is not.    The idea worked, with 
the prompting of Braden.    When they at last finished defining 
15 
"immigrant"  they were  unaware  that  they had  recorded  a 
16 
verbatim translation  of the  United   States  law. Thus 
Braden related some of the goings on at the conference. 
Perhaps the most important speech delivered at the con- 
ference was on the oocaaion when Braden delivered the clos- 
ing talk.    He noted in his speech that over the years many 
fine agreements and  resolutions had been made at Pan  Ameri- 
can conferences but that when delegates returned to their 
various countries they forgot them or never impressed their 
importance on their governments in order to ratify them. 
He charged the delegates to return to their countries and 
see to it that the work done at the oonferenoe was not in 
17 
vain.     They applauded him heartily. 
After the oonferenoe officially cloaed Spruille and 
Maria Braden went to Chile for a vacation.     It was their 
second trip there in recent years.     They had  gone to Maria 
Braden's native land after the close of the conference at 
Montevideo.     On  that  oocaaion Braden  received  the Grand 
18 
Cross,   Chile's highest  decoration,  while  in Santiago. 
This most recent visit found Braden delivering a apeech in 
which he explained President Roosevelt's Good  Neighbor Pol- 
icy.    He stressed that the policy was designed to erase some 
of the reaentment that existed among latins for North Amer- 
19 
loans. 
Maria and Spruille Braden sailed for home. Unbeknownst 
to them they would be back in Buenoa Airea before the year 
16 
was out and Spruille Braden would be faced with the moat 
difficult taak of hia diplomatic oareax. 
17 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CHACO  PEACE CONPERENCE 
On  the  same day  Spruille  Brad en  made his country's 
closing speech at the Pan-American Commercial Conference 
a major break occurred in the Chaco conflict.    Both Para- 
guay and Bolivia agreed to meet at the bargaining table to 
seek a pacific solution to their disputes.     The agreement 
was known as the Protocol of June 12,  1935.     One of the 
stipulations of the Protocol provided for Argentina to aot 
as host oountry for the peace talks.    Besides Paraguay and 
Bolivia six mediating powers would also gather in Argen- 
tina; they were to be the United states,  Uruguay,  Bra ail, 
Peru, Chile and Argentina.    The news that the peace talks 
would begin there,  in Buenos Aires,  on July 1, brought 
cheers from the assembled delegates at the Commercial 
Conferenoe. 
After returning to the United States Spruille Braden 
sought out the Under Secretary of State Sumner Wellea in 
Washington, D.  C.    When Braden found him the Under Secre- 
tary was enthusiaatic that Braden should become the next 
ambassador to Peru.    He stated that the  Preaident and Cor- 
dell Hull were anxious that he should accept.    Without 
qualification Braden said he would accept.    Wellea said 
that there might be a delay of a few weeka,  but he would 
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get in touch with him as  soon as he knew something definite. 
Several weeks went by and Braden returned to Washington.    By 
now it wss early September and he had not heard from Welles. 
On his return to the  capital Braden was told that Seoretary 
Hull was trying to locate him in New York.    The next day 
Braden oontaoted Hull. 
The Seoretary revealed that problems were developing 
in the Chaco Peaoe Conferenoe.    From the beginning of the 
peace conference the United States ambassador to Brazil 
represented the United States st the bargaining table in 
Buenos Aires.    Ambassador Hugh Gibson had had enough of the 
Chaco Peaoe Conference and was anxious to return to his 
embassy in Brazil.    It was decided that Braden would  succeed 
at that post.     Braden was st first reluotant  to aooept the 
position but after speaking to Sumner Welles he beoame 
oonvinoed of the importanoe of the task required of the 
United States ambassador-at-large in Buenos Aires.    Welles 
showed Braden a draft of a letter,   written by President 
Roosevelt,  to be sent  to the presidents of the  letin Amer- 
ican republics.     The President spoke of an impending war 
in Europe and that it was imperative that the Western Hemis- 
phere remain isolated from European hostilities.    Paramount 
to that end was a swift solution to the Chaco dispute. 
Braden was already aware that Hitler was preparing for 
war.    A friend of his had gone to a Krupp plant to inspect 
some turbines for the power company for whioh he was ohief 
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engineer.     He had   been  a World  War  I artillery officer. 
Aa he walked through the Krupp plant his trained eye 
recognized   parts  of weaponry that  by their  numbers  indi- 
cated  a   massive   arms   build-up.      The   rest   was   obvious;   Ger- 
1 
many was preparing for war. 
In 1946 Spruille Braden publiahed an artiole titled 
"The Germane in Argentina."    Braden gathered ouoh of the 
information  from a  aource  discovered  in  1941.     In it  Braden 
quoted  a German  professor,  Walter  Sievers  of Gieaaen  Uni- 
versity: 
If the German empire proposes to reconquor the posi- 
tion of a ruling power in the world...then let its aim 
be to acquire a deoiaive influenoe in the region where 
such influence is atill possible,  namely, in South 
America, and this is not merely by oocupying territory., 
but by forming there a base of operetions,  of a finan- 
cial,  politico-commercial,  industrial and even—in 
oase of necessity—military nature, for the State of 
South America,  against the inoreaeing avidity of the 
United  States.2 
Braden pointed out that Germans had been in South 
America  for over a hundred years and that they had already 
betrayed  some of the  characteristics  suggested  by Professor 
Sievers in 1917.    He cited the Argentine President Domingo 
Sermiento who said in 1882 that he was wary  of the German 
settlers who were gaining a  foothold in southern Brazil, 
Argentine, Uruguay and Paraguay.    He feared that one day they 
would be powerful and they would feel no love or obligation 
to their South American home but would remain true to the 
5 
Fatherland. 
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Braden went on to show that in more recent years the 
network of German influence had increased to include Chile, 
the foothills of the Andes, Bolivia and the area of the 
Chaco. It is interesting that the Chaoo war broke out at 
about the time Hitler brought National Socialism into 
ascendancy in Germany. According to the plan of the Euro- 
pean fascists, the Chaco Peace Conferenoe was to be a fail- 
ure. Italian and German diplomats busied themselves with 
efforts to destroy the conference, using ridicule to demora- 
lize the peacemakers. Hostilities came cloae to being 
renewed as the conference made little progress for long 
stretches of time but finally the Chaco problem was arbi- 
trated. In Braden's wordsi  "a disastrous general conflict 
had been avoided, the kind of war Germany had hoped would 
send the hemisphere asunder and make impossible the nearly 
4 
united front with which she was later faced." 
Before Braden made a decision as to whether or not he 
should go to the Chaoo Peace Conference, he spoke to friends 
among the press and within the State Department. Their con- 
sensus waa that the conference was near dissolution and the 
resumption of the war imminent. These were not enoouraging 
words but Sumner Welles and Maria Braden appealed to his 
pride and said in effect that if anyone could aave the con- 
ference it was he.  They also reminded him that he could 
best deal with Saavedra Lamas.  Braden finally aooepted.  He 
had been properly flattered and hia salary waa an added 
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inducement.     In  fact  Braden  called  himself the   "second 
5 
highest-paid employee of the United Stetee government." 
Before departing for Argentina Braden felt the need to go 
to Washington and get thoroughly briefed on the history of 
the  Chaco  dispute.     He would not  leave  until he had a  com- 
plete  knowledge  of the  situation,   despite  the  protestations 
of Welles  and  Hull. 
Braden had  learned that the Chaco dispute was one that 
concerned the delineation of the boundaries between Paraguay 
and Bolivia at the point where they met,  that being the Chaco 
Boreal.    Both countries had claimed the Chaco since colonial 
times when the Spanish kings on different occasions  granted 
the Chaco Boreal to both Paraguay and Bolivia.    Despite 
this  early  lack of certainty as  to whom  the  Chaco belonged 
it was not a serious  toplo of contention.    Bolivia'a inter- 
ests lay in the Pacific where she had a port in what is 
now the  coast  of Chile,  and  the   aristooratic character  of 
the Bolivian government oared little for the diverse eth- 
nicity of her peoples,  which resulted in natives on the 
borders seeking to be inoorporated within the  frontiers of 
neighboring countries.    During this period, from about 
1823-1885,  much of Bolivian aoil was ceded to the surrounding 
oountries.     The biggest loss to Bolivia came in 1884 when 
she lost her only port end entire coastline to Chile.    Prior 
to this tremendous loss, Paraguay and Argentina, in 1852, 
signed a treaty guaranteeing both banks of the navigable 
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Rio Paraguay to Paraguay. Bolivia protested claiming ripar- 
ian rights to the bordering west bank but to no avail. Be- 
tween 1865 and 1870 Paraguay was engaged in war with Argen- 
tina, Brazil and Uruguay. Bolivia remained idle as she was 
assured by the Triple Alliance that she could keep the west 
bank of the Paraguay River which she still claimed as her 
own. When the war ended, with Paraguay defeated, Bolivia 
sought to force her claims further.  She wanted the allies 
to sanction her precedence in the Chaco. They would not 
have this. Instesd the Chaco was divided into three parts 
by Argentina and the defeated Paraguay. Negotiations con- 
cerning the proper division of the Chaco broke down. Both 
countries appealed to Rutherford B. Hayes, President of the 
United States, to arbitrate the issue. Hayes ruled that 
Paraguay was legally entitled to the area in dispute. 
Bolivia would never aocept the Washington deoiaion, as she 
had no part in the arbitration, nor were her legal claims 
even heard. 
In 1879 there was a mutual effort between Paraguay and 
Bolivia to reaoh an aooord beneficial to both, but it proved 
an abortive effort as the Paraguayan Congress defeated the 
treaty. By 1885 Paraguay waa in desperate need of cepitali 
ao she began the sale of public lands including land in the 
Chaco.  As things turned out most of the area acquired went 
to Argentina.  In 1886 an effort was made to ratify the 
treaty that had taoitly been agreed to in 1879. Dr. Isaac 
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Tamayo of Bolivia and Dr.  Benjamin Aoeval of Paraguay met 
to aee if an amioable treaty might be finalised between the 
two countries.     The two foreign ministers signed a treaty on 
February 16,   1887.     It divided the land of the right bank of 
the Paraguay River into three areas,   one belonging to Boliv- 
ia,  one to Paraguay and the third to be arbitrated by King 
Leopold II of Belgium.    The treaty went a full year without 
being ratified by either country.    The time limit was ex- 
tended for nine months; finally, Bolivia ratified it but 
Paraguay would not and  the treaty failed. 
On January 12,   1907 the Pinilla Soler Protocol was 
signed.    Under its terms,  the President of Argentina was to 
arbitrate the zones of division within Paraguay.    He declined, 
however,  due to the fact  that Bolivia and Argentina had a 
temporary rupture of diplomatic relations.    The failure of 
this effort  to  sign  a workable   treaty was  due  to  the   lack of 
preparedness or even a preliminary consensus among the minis- 
ters ss to the essence of the  treaty.    Before the term oould 
expire without an agreement the Moreno-Mujfa Protocol 
extended the time limit for framing a  treaty to July 28, 
1916.    Two subsequent Moreno-Mujia protoools were needed, 
lssting until 1919.    Just as the othera,  they proved to be 
failures.     The   last  failure  came with  the  Gutierrez-Diaz  Leon 
Protoool which was signed on April 22,  1927.    This protoool 
came  to an  end   on  June  28,   1928,  without  deciding  the  terms 
for either arbitration or a direct agreement. 
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By the 1920'a Bolivia was building email military poate 
known as fortinea,  which aha used to anoroaoh upon the Para- 
guayan Chaco.    The Bolivian belief was that Paraguay wae ao 
poor and weak aha wouldn't be able to resist effectively. 
In 1921 the Paraguayans atarted building fortlnea of their 
own in direot  opposition to the Bolivian fortinea.    The 
Paraguayans were also in the prooeaa of oolonizing on the 
exterior and thua their fortinea served the dual purpose of 
preventing further encroachment and protecting her coloniz- 
7 
ing citizens.       The military preaaure on the opposing fron- 
tiers eventually led to an armed skirmish in December of 
1928.     It waa not until September 13,  1929, that thia 
"Vanguardia  Incident" waa settled by the International Con- 
ference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration 
with a   apecial Commission  of  Investigation.     Actually the 
only thing that waa  really accomplished  waa  the  obtaining of 
a  cease-fire.     All efforts  to  get the  belligerents  to sign 
a treaty failed. 
The Chaoo War  began in earnest   in  late  summer  of 1932. 
Bolivia initiated hoatilitiea by seizing a Paraguayan 
fortln.    Paraguay retaliated in kind.    Both belligerenta 
inoreaaed hoatilitiea.     Finally as both aidea were mobilising 
for wax neutral republics  triad to ezaot a 60-day truce.    It 
failed and  the Chaoo War waa on.    Before it would come  to a 
cloae 130,000 lives would be  loat, all of them in an effort 
to gain possession,  for their countriea, of the Chaoo Boreal, 
8 
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which consisted of great swamps and vast arid tracts that 
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alternately flooded during seasonal tropioal storms. 
The Protocol of June 12, 1935 brought hoatilltiea to 
an end. It was not until July 1 that delegates from the six 
mediating powers and representatives of the former bellig- 
erents arrived in Buenos Aires and began the peace confer- 
ence.  Spruille Braden did not arrive until the fall of that 
year. He was to replace Hugh Gibson, the ambassador to 
Brazil, who was anxious to return to Rio de Janeiro and 
could afford but a little time to counsel Braden about the 
present situation and personalities at the Chaco Conference. 
If there was an imminent danger to be everted it was 
that the conference might collapse, initiating the resump- 
tion of hostilities.  Indications were that if the fighting 
was renewed there would be four belligerents involved in- 
stead of two.  There was a belief that there was oil in the 
Chaco. Braden implied that this theory was promulgated by 
John Kenneth Galbraith. He went so far as to suggest that 
Standard Oil of New Jersey was financially backing Bolivia 
in the war effort and that Shell Oil was aiding with Para- 
guay. Although Braden sold the Bolivian oil fields to 
Standard Oil, he denied that the Chaco War had its basis in 
petroleum speculation and was financed by oil companiea. 
To date the Chaco has been found to be void of any signifi- 
cant oil deposits.  Paraguay was being backed but cot by 
Shell Oil. Her military benefactor was Argentina which 
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owned considerable property in Paraguay.    On one occasion 
Argentina put $10,000,000 worth of arms into Paraguay,  as 
well aa giving her arms throughout the war along with the 
use of Argentine military advisors.     Chile,  which borders 
both Argentina and Bolivia,  aided with the bolivianos. 
President Aleaaandri of Chile addreaaed a  letter to his 
Argentine counterpart Auguatin P.  justo,  to the effect 
that if peaoe did not come about  soon, Argentina might be 
facing Chile in a widening conflagration.    The letter was 
dated  exactly five   months  prior  to  the  date  when  the  bellig- 
erents met et the peaoe table. 
When Braden arrived at the dying Chaco Peaoe Confer- 
ence the nationa involved were aligned thuat    Peru,  Uruguay 
and the United Statea were essentially neutral, while Argen- 
tina supported Paraguay and Chile and Brazil leaned toward 
Bolivia.     Brazil'a  support  of Bolivia  went  baok to a  defen- 
sive agreement among Brazil,  Chile and Bolivia, all of which 
bordered Argentina,  and was meant to prevent the latter 
10 
from any untoward ambitiona. It was Bra den'a teak to rein- 
vigorate the then pallid conference or Battle for the 
optionj    chaoa in the Weatern Hemiaphere while Nazi Germany 
sped up an irreversible timetable. 
Three weeks into 1936, a major victory for the peece 
conference was achieved with the aigning of the Protocoliaed 
Aot which extended the truce without a deadline and made 
provisions  for the   exchange of prisoners of war.     It was 
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deoided that each belligerent would pay the other for the 
maintenance  and  transportation  of the  prisoners.     Paraguay 
benefitted greetly in thie exchange.     Peraguey peid an 
indemnity of 400,000 Argentine pesos while Bolivia paid 
2,800,000 or a net gain to Paraguay of 2,400,000 Argentine 
pesos. 
One of the artiolee of the Protooollzed Act wes s reit- 
eration of the June 12 Protocol concerning the build-up of 
weapons slong the Chaoo.    It was stated thet neither bellig- 
erent could add in the number of weapons that it held  "ex- 
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cept for the amount indispensable for replacement."        A 
neutral military commission was formed to investigate and 
see if the article wes being upheld.     The methodology 
employed by the commission was suspeot but their conclusion 
that Paraguay and Bolivia aoted in accord with the provis- 
ions of the Protocol was received as good  news.    Apparently 
it was the news they wanted to hear,  for their conclusions 
went unchallenged,  lest something unpleasant be unoovered. 
The commission was still functioning when Bolivia began pur- 
chasing weapons from the United States.    In June of 1936 an 
American and a Brazilian military observer were appointed 
by the Chaoo Conference to investigate.    They reported that 
both Paraguay and Bolivia had violated the  Protooollsed Act. 
Spruille Braden was the first to  state that it behooved 
the oonferenoe greatly to make certain that the  belligerents 
remained true to their ratified agreements.    As early aa 
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February of 1936 ha oallad for the investigation of arms 
shipments  sent  to either  belligerent.     He  requested  that 
the nations manufacturing and exporting arms to the coun- 
tries in question keep the oonferenoe informed.    Although 
Braden's idea would have provided an excellent  check on 
the former belligerents,  the suggestion was put aaide. 
The  violations  uncovered  in  June  of 1936 went unpuniahed, 
This waa due to the fact that Bolivia and Paraguay assured 
that they were strictly abiding by the tenets of the Chaoo 
Peace Conference.     Just as whistling in the dark is a pro* 
phylactic to danger,  by some,  ao too these assurances were 
aooepted and unbiased reports discarded.     Sensing thst the 
peace conference would do nothing should they discover hard 
evidenoe of an arms build-up both Paraguay and Bolivia 
blatantly proceeded to oarry on an arms raoe.    On July 12, 
1937*  the members of the peace oonferenoe decided they had 
had enough.     They voted  to investigate  arms  build-ups and 
troop movements of both countries.     Before they oould 
the Paraguayan delegation protested stating that Paraguay 
had never violated an article of the Protooollzed Aot.    The 
members of the peace oonferenoe then reconsidered.    Would 
pursuance of the investigation constitute an affront to the 
government of Paraguay?    Would  that nation withdraw from the 
oonferenoe?    Worse, would  fighting be renewed?    The investi- 
gation was  cancelled.     Actually,   Saavedra   Lamas  knew  some- 
thing that would have  prolonged the investigation had he 
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informed the peace conference of what he knew.  The president 
of the Paraguayan delegation, Juan Iaidro Ramirez, had told 
him confidentially that Paraguayan troops near the Chaoo 
12 
numbered 10,000, twice the permitted totel. 
During the yeara 1936 and 1937 there had been two 
revolutions in both Paraguay and Bolivia, which could have 
caused considerable trouble at the peece oonferenoe. Each 
new government wanted to repudiate the actions of their 
predecessors et Buenos Aires.  Clearly, this oould have led 
to chaos but it was made olear to eaoh of them that requisite 
to their geining diplomatic recognition was the honoring of 
commitments at the Chaco Peeoe Conference. 
Late in 1936 the Maintenance of Peaoe Conference con- 
vened in Buenos Aires.  Just prior to its opening Cerlos 
Saavedra Lamas was awarded the Nobel Peaoe Prize for his 
efforts in getting Bolivia and Paraguay to the peece teble. 
President Roosevelt suggested that the oonferenoe be held 
at Buenos Aires for the eame reason he backed Saavedra 
Lamas for the Nobel Peeoe Prize. As Argentine foreign 
minister, Saavedra Lamas would be chairman of both confer- 
ences, thus adding to his esteem. The President hoped to 
placate the Argentine Poreign Miniater by booating hia ego. 
The plan worked until Saavedre Lamaa won the peaoe prize. 
In his memoirs, Spruille Braden charged Saavedra Lamas 
with starting rumors about him. One rumor began to oiroulate 
in Paraguay oonoerning Braden's former lntereat in Bolivian 
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oil; it suggested that the interest was still there.    The 
idea, it seemed to Braden, was that the Paraguayans should 
protest his presence at the Chaoo Peaoe Conference.    The 
rumors were traced to a new military attaohe,  reoently from 
Argentina.    Braden said that nothing came of it as he  "had 
the confidence of the Paraguayan delegation."    Braden alleges 
that  Saavedra   Lamas  made  other  efforts to spread  damaging 
rumors about him hut ceased his  machinations when they all 
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proved failures. 
A dramatic change ooourred in the conference in Feb- 
ruary of 1938.     The newly elected president of Argentina, 
Roberto Ortiz,  removed Saavedra  Lamas as Argentine Foreign 
Minister.  He was replaced with Jose Luis Cantilo, a man 
generally believed to be more agreeable to work with than waa 
his predecessor.     In May 1938,  Spruille Braden suggested to 
the peaoe conference that they send committees,   formed of 
delegates,  to Paraguay and Bolivia.    He wanted to reproduoe 
the psychological conditions that existed when the June 12 
Protocol was  agreed  upon.     Braden was  to  travel to the 
Bolivian oapitol of La Paz accompanied by Manini Rios, who 
headed the Uruguayan delegation, and  Orlando Leite Ribeiro, 
a Brazilian delegate.    The oommittee Braden headed would  be 
in audience with the government headed by German Busch, who 
was the only military hero for the Bolivians in the disas- 
trous war.    President Busoh staffed his cabinet with members 
of his military  junta.     The  foreign minister was  a  civilian 
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diplomat but unfortunately was terrified of his military 
colleagues and proved to be tight-lipped with information, 
and the military men proved  laconic.    Braden decided he 
would atir aome excitement.     He stated that he had learned 
from various sources that the Bolivian government had, with- 
in five months,  purchased twelve to fifteen million dollars 
worth of military equipment.    Colonel Olmos, the Bolivian 
Minister of War,  responded in a surprising manner; he told 
Braden that his information was correct except that his total 
was short by ten million dollars.     He oontinued,  saying that 
the initial setback suffered by the Bolivians was due  to 
German generals who were employed in guiding Bolivian for- 
tunes.    Bolivia,  he said, was remiss in that it had not 
bothered to chart the Chaoo Boreal and had no knowledge 
where the precious waterholes were looated.    He went on 
to say that Bolivia had corrected her miatakes. 
Braden and  the other delegates oould see what was 
happening,   "the Bolivians were ready to defeat the Para- 
guayans, and wanted no part of any peace treaty.    They were 
14 
going back to war."        Braden rhetorically asked if they were 
blatantly disregarding their oountry's pledge to seek peace. 
He aoouaed them of a breaoh of faith and charged them with 
"flagrantly violating your oountry's pledged word in the 
Protoool and the Protoooliaed Act....I want you to know that 
my government will consider that an unfriendly aot."    Braden 
went on to oommit all the mediatory powera and the reat of 
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Latin America  ID his bluff.    His gamble paid off and the 
Bolivian junta capitulated, agreeing to oontinue negotia- 
tions. 
Near the end of June, Bolivia felt oertain that the 
peace oonfeienoe would  fail.    Bolivia began to make further 
preparations for war.     On July 2, President Busoh called 
for a national mobilization and  Bolivian troops were sent 
into the Chaoo,  perhaps with the ides of intimidating 
Paraguay.     The situation at this point was very tense, 
and for more then one reason.    Not only was Bolivia prepared 
and aligned for war,  but Germany had annexed Austria.     The 
Anschluss waa complete in March,  1938.    The war that seemed 
inevitable in Europe, since the rise of Hitler,   waa now 
approaching palpable reality.    The  Latin America  that the 
National Socialists wanted in a  state of confusion was now 
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on the verge of just that. 
The  Bolivian  movement into  the Chsco  caused  a  lot of 
anxiety in Buenos Aires.     Brsden cites the Paraguayan dele- 
gation as being diffioult to deal with, particularly aince 
they had  the most to lose, having made the greater gaina in 
the Chaco.    Oeronimo Zublzaretta  was the president of the 
Paraguayan delegation.    Bra den described him as having 
integrity but said he was very stubborn.    The reoent Boliv- 
ian aotion caused a  lot of pressure to be put upon Zublza- 
retta.    One day during the oriels Bra den reoelved a tele- 
phone osll from Dr. Efraim Cardoso of the Paraguayan 
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delegation.    He said he wanted to meet with Braden and 
Zublzaretta later In the day.    When Braden arrived he waa 
presented with a memorandum.    Braden was elated.    He aald 
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of it*     "essentially it was the treaty of peaoe."        Zubl- 
zaretta had written the draft; incorporated within it were 
the ideas the mediators had been trying to get across. 
Cardozo and Zublzaretta authorized the United States 
ambassador to oontinue negotiations using the memorandum as 
a guideline} but he must tell no one of it.     Braden pro- 
tested.    He must tell the State Department and he had  to 
tell Diez de Medina,  the Bolivian foreign minister with 
whom he would have  to work closely.    They agreed but dis- 
approved of his telling Jose' Maria Cantilo, the chairman 
of the Peaoe Conference} apparently they diatrusted him, but 
they relented slightly and allowed Braden  to inform Argentine 
President  Ortiz. 
Braden immediately went to speak to the President.     The 
President read the memorandum and expressed his feelings 
that the draft waa doomed  to failure.    Braden lnaisted that 
it would work and after oonsiderable persuasion Ortiz came 
to see things as Braden did.    Ortiz went further saying, 
"Consider yourself my ambassador....Any commitments or any 
statements you make for your own government I authorise you 
18 
to make for me and my government."        Spruille Braden spent 
the next two days dsveloping the document into a workable 
peace treaty. 
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It was now Bradea's teak to gat the approval of the 
other mediators.     Moat of  them would  be   tractable  but he 
expected trouble from Barreda Laoa of Peru ao he uaed a 
ploy on him.     He got into a discussion with Barreda Laoa 
concerning the  Chaco.     Braden pretended  to  Interpret  some- 
thing he said aa being a brilliant idea.    It concerned the 
concept  of two  zones  in  the   Chaco  whose  frontier would  be 
deoided through arbitration.    Barreda Laoa was convinced 
that that was what he had aaid.    Diez de Medina'a approval 
of the idea oonvinced him of his own brilliance and he cer- 
tainly would not stand  in the way of his  "own" idea being 
approved by the mediators. 
The peaoe conference was now receiving some difficulty 
from an unexpected aouroe.     Gero'nimo  Zubizaretta ,  the 
drafter of the original document, had gotten cold  feet. 
Braden interpreted  this aa a move to get some  political 
recognition  to  enhance  his  presidential  ambitions.     Braden 
took a rough initiative and aoouaed  Zubizaretta of violat- 
ing the June  12  Protocol.     Braden and  the  president  of the 
Paraguayan delegation became involved in a heated quarrel. 
Finally,  Chairman  Cantilo adjourned  the  session  deolaring 
that it would ait again in two daya.    When it next aat the 
Paraguayan foreign minister,  Ceoilio Baez,  spoke.    He aaid 
that Paraguay would honor her aoleon pledgee» in short,   aha 
would continue  negotiations  with an aim toward  resolving 
peaoe.    Braden boldly asked who spoke with the aovereigc 
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authority of Paraguay, Baez or Zubizaretta.    Baez insisted 
that what ha said would  stand and at this Zubizaretta 
resigned as chairman of the Paraguayan delegation,    for- 
tunately,   for  the   Paraguayans and  the  conference,   the 
Paraguayan war hero  Jose Eatigarribfa waa in  Buenos  Aires. 
He came into the peaoe conference and filled the void left 
by Zubizaretta.    He did ao despite  lacking the authority 
for  such action.     Nevertheless,   he waa more  than welcome; 
Eatigarribia  waa the only Paraguayan who could make  a  con- 
cession without diminishing his popularity.    After Eatigar- 
ribia waa aeated there waa no further trouble from the 
Paraguayan delegation. 
There was one last false alarm,  this coming from 
Chairman Cantilo.     The last daya of conference negotiations 
were becoming bogged down.     Cantilo declared that the situa- 
tion waa hopeless,  and waa ready to dissolve the peaoe 
conference,  but before he could Brad en called for an adjourn- 
ment.    That night at a dinner Maria Braden spoke to Cantilo 
and  persuaded  him  to continue,   saying that  the  peace would 
aoon be finalized.     On July 9, 1938 the Chaoo peace treaty 
waa aigned,  juat a week after Bolivian troopa moved into the 
Chaoot but there were atill things yet to be done. Both 
Bolivia and Paraguay had to ratify the peace treatiea, which 
they did during the following montha.    Laatly,  the aix med- 
iating powera were to arbitrate the frontiera of the Chaoo. 
The arbitration waa finalized on Ootober 10,  1938.    Paraguay 
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received  large gains in the Chaco and Bolivia had to be 
20 
satisfied with the retention of her oil fields. (For 
further details on the awards of the Chaco arbitration see 
the Appendix.) 
Spruille  Braden was  the hero  of the  Chaco   Peace  Con- 
ference.    He contributed more than anyone else in keeping the 
oonference together so that an amicable settlement might be 
reaohed.     In 1959 John W. White, former correspondent for 
the New York Times,  sent Braden a letter outlining his 
contributions at the oonferenoet 
The death of Saavedra Lamas calls to mind...one of 
the greatest injustices....It was you who should have 
been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.     It was you, 
working single-handed...who brought about a peaoe agree- 
ment.... You asked me not to report to the New York Times 
your partioipation in bringing about the peaoe agree- 
ment....! did  aa you asked....It was the only  instance 
in my forty-five years of newspaper reporting that  I 
ever allowed anyone to persuade me not  to tell the 
truth about the situation I was covering.21 
39 
Chapter III—Footnotes 
•'•Memoirs,  pp. 142, 144-145,  58. 
2 
Spruille Braden, "The Germans in Argentina," The 
Atlantic Monthly, April, 1946, p. 37. 
5Ibid. 
4Ibid.. pp. 37, 39. 
^Memoirs, pp. 145-146. 
6Ibid.. p. 146. 
'David H.  Zook, Jr.,  The Conduct of the Chaoo War  (New 
Haven, Conneotioutt    United Printing Ser ices,  Inc., 
I960),  pp.  15,  25-37. 
Braden,   "Inter-American Commercial Arbitration and 
Goodwill," pp.  390-391,  388. 
^Rout,  Politics...Chaoo Peaoe. p. X. 
10Memoirs.  pp. 149-151. 
11Bout,  Politlos...Chaoo Peaoe. pp. 231-233,  224. 
12Ibid.,  pp.  116-121. 
13Memoirs,  pp.  170-172,  174,  177-179. 
14n 
15- 
16 
'Ibid.,  pp.  183-184. 
bid.,  pp.  184-185. 
Rout,  Politics...Chaco Peace. p. 211. 
17Memolrs.  pp. 187-188. 
18Ibld..   p.   188. 
19Ibid..   pp.   188-191. 
20"Text of Award Fixing the Chaoo Frontiers," New York 
Times,  Oct.  11, 1938,  p. 17. 
40 
21. L"0n Spruille Braden's Contribution to Solution of the 
Chaco Dispute," Into r-Aiper loan Boonomio Affairs.    Vol. XIV, 
Pall,  I960,  p.  ion 
41 
CHAPTER  17 
THE  COLOMBIAN EMBASSY 
As early as  1937  Sprullle  Braden had  been promised 
the Colombian Embassy by President Roosevelt and Cordell 
Hull.     Prior to Sprullle Braden there had been no Colom- 
bian Embassy.    It had just recently been elevated to that 
status and  Braden was  to  be  the  first ambassador  assigned 
to that post. 
After  returning to the States and being greeted  by 
President Roosevelt, Braden made several speeches prais- 
ing the merits of the Good Neighbor Policy.    He spoke of 
the  liberal trade  practices  of the  United  States and  cited 
Latin America's adherence  to democratic principles which 
1 
formed a  tie  that bound  the two peoples together.      Braden 
pointed out that Americana had fewer ware than Europe and 
he gave   three  reasons  as an explanation.     One—"a  spirit 
of brotherhood among American peoples;"    two—"the func- 
tioning of Democracy!" and three--"respect for law and 
2 
international agreements."      These slightly naive notions 
would change in the future. 
After  spending some  time at  the  State Department  to 
brief himself on the situation in Colombia, Braden set sail 
for his post late in January 1939.    During his briefing 
period  in Washington Braden came across some  information 
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that had he been a less thorough diplomat might have altered 
the outcome of World War II.    He was studying some data 
concerning Scadta, a German owned airline of Colombia. 
The airline employed  several German pilots who remained 
military reserve offioers.    Reportedly some were  "anti- 
3 
American and ardently pro-Nazi."      Some of the Germans had 
become naturalized Colombians but that did not mitigate 
any danger  that might have existed sinoe German reservists 
were subject to the oommends of Berlin.    Another factor 
worthy of oonsideration was that German citizenship was 
considered permanentj  the change of nationalities was merely 
symbolic     Allegiance  was still owed  to the  fatherland. 
The danger presented by Soadta did not reside alone in the 
fact that pro-Nazi pilots were in their employ.    The exist- 
ing threat was that the Panama Canal waa nearby and that 
Scadta controlled  "virtually all the landing fields and 
4 
radio services in Colombia."      Another problem existed; 
the Panama Canal was virtually without defenses.  It was 
particularly vulnerable to an air attaok.    Should a global 
war take plaoe it would behoove the enemy to destroy the 
Canal.    Sprullle Braden worked from that premise and pre- 
sumed that  the Nazis in Colombia were proceeding on that 
same premise. 
The information he uncovered waa more in the form of 
vague hints.    Those hints suggested that there was some 
conneotion between Soadta and Pan American Airways.    Braden 
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confronted the State Department with the theory.    They 
knew nothing.    He questioned the Navy and War Deportments. 
They were also In the dark as to a possible link between 
the airlines.    Some flatly denied the existence of a rela- 
tionship.    Braden decided he would go directly to Pan 
American.    He had an appointment made for him in the name 
of Sumner Welles,  with Juan Trippe,   President of the Air- 
ways. 
The appointment as it turned out was for the day 
prior to Braden's departure for Colombia.    Braden went 
to the Pan American offioe on the agreed date only to find 
Juan Trippe had been called out of town on important busi- 
ness.    Braden was infuriated.    He told the State Department 
"to raise hell with Fan  American j"  he  demanded  to see  someone 
5 
with authority that same day. 
He received an appointment that afternoon with Evan 
Young,  a former member of the foreign service and now a 
vice president of the airline.    When the angry Braden arrived 
he immediately asked about the relationship between the two 
airlines.    Young employed evasion and  implied there was 
DO connection between the two.    Braden angrily beat the 
table with his fists and insisted,   "Mr. Young,  Pan American 
Airways has an interest in Soadta, and I propose to know 
what that lntereat is."      Apparently,  Mr. Young was suf- 
ficiently impressed with Braden's insistence and rough 
manner.     He  told him what he wanted  to hear.     Pan  American 
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owned 84  percent  of Soadta.     Braden felt  certain  that had 
Juan  Trippe  kept  his  appointment  that he  would have  been 
able to preserve his secret; with the possibility that 
Braden would not have found out until it was too late. 
After Braden and his family arrived  in Bogota,  the new 
ambassador was in  for a   surprise.     A pro-Nazi attitude  did 
not  exist solely among expatriated  Germans.     It had  been 
discovered that  Spanish priests of the Uraba area of 
Colombia were aiding and  engaging in espionage with known 
Nazis.     (It was known that often where there was a Spanish 
clergy in Latin America  it was pro-Nazi in philosophy and 
volition.)    Braden found that a gulf of Uraba religious 
order  preached a  vigorous  anti-American  doctrine.     There 
were Jesuits  that were tainted with the same sentiments. 
However,  the most significant anti-American feeling within 
the church came from the Archbishop of Colombia.    On the 
whole, from bottom to top the clergy of Colombia waa 
considered to be pro-Nazi. 
An expected result of a widespread pro-Nazi olergy 
would  be  the  growing of that  sentiment among the  laity. 
The knowledge that Colombian citizens were sympathetic to 
the Nazi cause was not surprising.     On one ocoaaion Braden's 
daughters Pat and  leurite went riding with aome friends, 
snd some Colombian army officers joined them.    The girls 
spoke perfect Spaniah and there were no inquiriea as to 
their identity.    The group stopped at a restaurant for 
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some refreshments.     The army officers made no seoret of 
their pro-Nazi attitudes.    The infectious  enthusiasm of 
the offioers spread to the restaurant owner who too waxed 
enthusiastic.     He was so delighted with this party that he 
took them into a back room and displayed to them his bullet- 
making machine.    When the girls returned home they reported 
to their father.    A few  days later the restaurant was 
raided  and   the  machine  was  removed. 
As it turned out,  one of the offioers in the party 
was the illegitimate son of the Colombian Foreign Minister, 
Lopez de Mess.     Lopez was a democrat and a bachelor and he 
had the reputation for being a playboy.    The mother of his 
illegitimate son was known to be pro-Nazi and rumor had it 
that Lopez was one of the lovers of a German woman,  a 
known Nazi agent.    The Foreign Minister was characterized 
as quixotic and with his head in the clouds,   but neverthe- 
less wss an able administrator. 
The President of Colombia, Eduardo Santos, was found 
to be pro-American and Democratic in attitude.     Braden 
found him to be of greet help in all matters that required 
his counsel.     Braden did have a criticism of Santos whioh 
was that the President was "politically timid" and  "inde- 
7 
oisive."      Perhaps part of this was due to the oriticism 
received by the previous two presidents concerning the 
charge that they were being dominated until they had becoma 
virtually the puppets of the United States.    Despite the 
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President's  efforts  to avoid such an  opprobrium,   Braden 
and Santos had a good working relationship. 
Laureano Gomez was a  Colombian  Senator and  commanded 
the Conservative Party.    Gomez owned £1 Siglo, one of 
Colombia's foremost newspapers.    He was also very anti- 
American.    Braden arranged a meeting with Gomez soon after 
he arrived in Bogota.    Gomez had been making his fervent 
anti-Americanism known in the Senate and through his news- 
paper.    Braden asked the Senator tbe source of his anti- 
Americanism.     Gomez  spoke  of  "Yankee   Imperialism" and   tbe 
American  "steal" of the Panama Canal.    He went on to say 
that he was glad that the Panamanians lost the Canal Zone 
to the Americans because  they were a very inferior people. 
Curiously  this  man who would  later become  President of 
Colombia had written a book espousing his theory that all 
peoples living in equatorial regions were useless and  below 
standard.     Laureano Gomez had many business dealings with 
Germans,  and when we consider his thesis we are not sur- 
prised that his political proclivities coincided with those 
of the  "master race," the Nazis. 
Braden and Gomez spoke for several hours and  they 
parted amicably.    Surprisingly, Braden found that Gomez 
eased upon his anti-Amerioan diatribes both in the Ssnate 
and within his newspaper.    His newspaper spoke of the 
Ambassador in glowing terms.     This pleasant state of affairs 
laated for about six monthsj then, without warning, Gomez 
47 
attacked  Braden  and  the  United  States.     Breden  felt it 
was time for another long talk.    The result was the same 
aa the first meeting.    Gomez could  see no reason why the 
United States and Colombia could not be good frienda. 
Gomez returned to his friendly attitude toward the Ambassa- 
dor and the United States,  privately and publicly. 
After getting himself sufficiently acquainted with 
the personality and political environs of Bogota* and Colom- 
bia,  Braden returned to the task he considered of foremost 
importance.     It was paramount that the Germana and Nazi 
sympathizers  be removed from Soadta.    Just aa the United 
States slept in regard to the danger at Pearl Harbor so too 
was the peril et the Panama Canal ignored.    Braden requeated 
money from the State Department ao that he oould form a 
system for gathering information.    The requeat was denied. 
Braden's naval attache was given $1,500.00 per annum to pay 
informants,  but after a half a year passed the funds were 
cut off.   It was apparent thet Breden would have to be 
extremely resouroeful to prevent a catastrophe at the 
Panama Canal. 
Soadta had been created in Colombia by Peter Paul 
Von Bauer,  a German as were all the employees of the air- 
line,  from mechanics to pilot.    Braden remembered what he 
heard from his friend Eddie Riokenbacker who quoted Hermann 
Goeringt 
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Our whole future ie in the air....We will do three 
things,     first we will teaoh gliding as a sport to 
all our young men.    Then we will build up a  fleet 
of commercial planes,  eaoh easily converted to mili- 
tary operation.     Finally we will create the skeleton 
of a military air foroe.    When the time come a, we will 
put all three together—and the German empire will be 
reborn.     We must win through the air."8 
It appeared to Braden that Scadta was part of that movement 
and a clever way of by-passing the Treaty of Versailles, 
which limited  German  military build-ups. 
Evan Young had assured Braden that Peter Paul Von Bauer 
was not German but Austrian, that he was anti-Nazi and even 
partially Jewish.     He  was  supposed  to hold  the  view  that  the 
United States should be dominant in hemispheric aviation. 
Braden first met Bauer in April 1939.    After arranging 
a little ruse he disoovered that Bauer had lied and that 
he couldn't be trusted. 
In September 1939,  David Grant, an attorney of Pan 
American,  reported to the Ambassador to inform him that 
the airline had dismissed ten Germans working for Scadta 
and seven more dismissals were pending.    Grant said he 
would travel to Medellfn to make oertain that the eeven 
were dispatched from their duties.    By the time he returned 
to Bogota',  Braden had come to realize that the dismissal 
of the original ten was a fabrication.     It was now Ootober 
and World War II had already begun.    Braden oaatlgated 
Grant for his deoeption. 
Grant then had the gall to tell Braden that he was going 
to President Santos to inform him that Peter Paul Von Bauer 
49 
owned  51 percent of Scadta.     Braden  told him he would not 
be allowed to  tell Santos  that since Fan American owned 
84 percent.    Apparently Grant was in the dark as to the 
truth of the ownership| he confessed,   "Trippe is the only 
9 
one who knows what's going on." 
When  the  war began,  Braden decided he must tell Pres- 
ident Santos about the Soadta situation.    Braden was flab- 
bergasted when Santos would not believe him.    The President 
told him "only  two weeks ago Bauer sat just where you're 
sitting now and   gave  me his solemn word of honor that he 
10 
owned  51 percent  of Soadta." He added that   the Minister 
of War could produce sn affidavit belonging to Bauer show- 
ing 51 percent ownership of the sirline.    It took a while 
for Braden to convince the War Minister and the President 
of Bauer's spurious claim but he  succeeded in doing so 
without producing documentary evidence, which he was will- 
ing to do.     Braden was now convinced  that Bauer and   Pan 
American were involved in a conspiracy which at the very 
least was geared to keep Scadta and its personnel intact. 
Santos was willing to co-operate.    He said he would work 
to get leading Scadta personnel removed from the airline. 
He also said he would put armed officers of the Colombian 
Air Corps aboard  Soadta flights as oo-pilots to prevent the 
planes from flying off oourse. 
Immediately after the David Grant incident Braden 
wired the  State Department and made the demand that they 
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insist upon Fan American  sending an executive  of the com- 
pany to Bogota  to consult with him on Scadta.    George Rihl, 
Pan American exeoutive Vice-President, arrived in Bogota on 
October 16.    During the next four months Rihl would repeat- 
edly lie and  renege  on Pan American promises  concerning the 
elimination of Germans within Scadta.    Braden was fed up. 
On February 15,  1940, he issued an ultimatum.    He told 
Rihl that he had  until 6:00 p.m.   next Monday to  remove 
certain Nazis from the employ of Scadta and replace them 
with Americans.     If they did not do that by the time allowed 
Braden promised  to wire the State Department and state  that 
he could no longer feel responsible for the safety of the 
Panama Canal.     "Moreover.   I would denounce Pan American to 
11 
the President,   to Congress, and to the American people." 
The threat produced a good deal of discomfort.    Juan Trippe 
went to Washington and protested to the  State Department. 
They expressed concern but cabled Braden giving him a free 
hand in the matter.     Finally,  when 6:00 p.m.   arrived  Braden's 
naval attache informed him that Rihl had completed the  first 
steps in removing the Nazis from Scadta. 
The removal of top Nazi officers and the insertion of 
American administrators into the airline by no means served 
substantially to diminish the threat to the Canal.    One 
night after the transition had already been made Amerioan 
officers entered the Scadta office in Baranquillai there 
they found Hans Hasendorf,  Soadta communications chief, in 
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conversation with Berlin.    He was using a radio which sup- 
posedly had enough strength to reaoh only the airport.     At 
about the  same time as  this event a letter was intercepted 
addressed  to a German pilot for Scadta.     It was sent by a 
former German pilot  of the airline who  left Colombia to 
join the  Luftwaffe as a   fighter pilot wben   the war broke 
out.    In the letter he related how Hermann Goering 
reproached him for  leaving Colombia, where his presence 
was of value and returning to Germany where  there was an 
abundance of fighter pilots. 
One of  the weaknesses of the  Panama Canal defense was 
the fact that  the installation there employed a single 
radar unit that had  a  range of fifteen miles and could 
only soan one  direction.     Part of the understanding Braden 
worked out with George Rihl was that Pan American would 
install three Adoock Directions Finders.    They were  to be 
installed at three different locations,   in Cali,  the Gulf 
of Uraba and at Barranquilla.     The   juxtapositioning of  the 
Direction Finders would be designed to place accurately any 
aircraft within a general area  of the Canal Zone by means 
of triangulation.    Through this method,   should a plane veer 
off its designated course and head  toward the Canal ade- 
quate warning would prepare the Canal Zone with its anti- 
aircraft artillery.    It seems that the Direction Finders 
were somehow delayed.    Braden expressed his conoern onoe 
again through the auspices of the State Department.    Sumner 
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Welles was told by a representative of Pan American  that 
the first Adcock Direotion Finder would arrive in Colombia 
and  that the remaining two would be there during the 
following weeks. 
Eventually,   the Adcock Direction Finders were  installed 
and the  Panama Canal was  provided with an adequate warning 
system.     Still there  were  other problems not  yet eradi- 
cated.     There had been 134 Nazis employed by  the airline; 
after the  initial removal of the officers 84   remained.     It 
was now May   10,   1940,   the day Adolf Hitler began storming 
Europe with hia Blitzkreig.     On that day Spruille Braden was 
in Washington,   D.C.     He was to have   been going over atrategy 
for the situation in Colombia.    When the news broke concern- 
ing Blitzkreig their plans had   to be altered.     President 
Santos wanted the transition of airline personnel to be 
done  more  slowly than Braden had proposed}  so Braden 
acquiesced to  the President's wishes,   since he had  been 
very helpful previously.     The German offensive  in Europe 
meant that  Nazi personnel now had to be removed  immediately. 
Braden wired  Santos and told him of developments.     He backed 
Braden completely.     Then Braden made a trip to New York City 
where he met with George   Rihl.     Rihl waa  told  that American 
replacements had  to be sent right away.    Pan Amerioan would 
have to pay the bill for  the immediate tranaferral of per- 
sonnel.    However,  Braden promised that he would do what he 
could  to get the government to reimburse the airline for 
its expenses. 
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Braden returned to Colombia  after the arrangements had 
been made and one month to   the day on June  10,   1940 the 
changeover was  complete.     Braden and  Santos could be  satis- 
fied that the  Panama Canal was safe.     It was not   long after 
that they received vindication for their efforts.     Santos' 
approval and   support of Braden*s actions brought on a  heavy 
attack from the conservatives and   Laureano G-jSmez but  they 
ceased after  many efforts were made  to sabotage  Scadta 
flights,   apparently caused   by former airline   employees. 
Maps used by the  Nazi pilots were  found  to have  mountains 
charted  1,500 to  2,000 feet   shorter  than they actually were. 
Seemingly these maps were made in anticipation of the  time 
when Americans took over  the airline.     The maps would  be a 
built-in  form of sabotage.     However,   neither the maps nor 
the more  overt attempts at sabotage ever  succeeded.     At 
most they were responsible for delays.     A further vindi- 
cation came directly out of Berlin.    On at least three 
occasions short-wave dispatches  threatened the  lives of 
Spruille  Braden and  President Eduardo Santos  for expelling 
German nationals from Scadta. 
Despite   the  fact Braden  lacked the funds he managed  to 
establish a highly competent  intelligence   "staff."    It was 
led by a German Catholio priest who was violently anti-Nazi. 
He had immigrated to Colombia after receiving a brutal beat- 
ing at the hands of Nazis.     He received the same  treatment 
in Bogota   by  other  Nazis.     He was glad to tell what he knew 
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about Nazi sympathizers in Colombia.     He enlisted  other 
anti-Nazis both native end German.    This staff enabled 
Spruille Braden to compile a  blacklist of Colombians who 
12 
had betrayed an antipathy toward America. 
In a  New  York Times article dated August 16,   1940 and 
titled   "Nazis use U.   S.   Funds in Colombia for Economic War 
on Democracies," German-American sales agents operating in 
Colombia were using profits from Ameriosn goods to promote 
anti-American propaganda.    Germany, which was out off from 
trading with Colombia, wanted trade rapprochement with that 
country.    She promised a 25 to 30 percent undercutting of 
United States prices.    She also predioted the imminent 
subjugation of all of Europe and warned that Colombia had 
best be co-operative lest she develop a powerful enemy. 
The situation described in the Times had  little to do 
with that in whioh Spruille  Braden was involved.     His main 
"economic" concern was  the  stealing and  smuggling of plati- 
num out   of Colombia  which made its way to  Germany.     Germany 
had also gotten  the Colombian metal through more legitimate 
avenues.     Platinum was sold  to Argentina  where German agents 
could obtain it for the Fatherland.    When the war sterted 
the United States wanted to eliminate the flow of Colombian 
platinum to Germany.    Braden spoke to President Santos and 
persuaded him "to issue a deoree that no platinum could be 
sold or imported except against an irrevocable letter of 
credit in a New York bank."    Except for occasional thefts 
Colombian platinum was out off from Germany. 
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With December 7,  1941 came Pearl Harbor and with it 
came a unified Colombia.  Aa recently as June 2,   1941 there 
had been an attempt at a  coup d'etat by aome military offi- 
cers.    Two weeks prior to the attempt Ambassador Braden 
warned President Santos.     The warning went unheeded but for- 
tunately,  the attempted coup d'etat proved a failure.    When 
the Japanese bombed  Pearl Harbor the Conservatives headed 
by Laureano Gomez  Joined  forces with the Liberals to vote 
15 
a severance in diplomatic   relations with Germany. 
On December 17,  1941 Braden was nominated Ambassador 
to Cuba where he would take hia post after the beginning 
of the new year.    Before he left Colombia he addressed the 
American Society of Colombia which he had founded two year a 
previoualy.     The object of the  Sooiety was to build better 
relations between the peoples of two countries.     On a whole 
the Sooiety was a success.    Braden gave a short speech and 
it dealt with the  recent attack on Pearl Harbor.    He praised 
the unity of Colombia and   the  United  States and  atated  that 
the common Democratic cause would prevail.     "Because of 
our moral strength and phyaical power, we ahall be invin- 
cible and,  what ia more vital,  our might is based on 
16 
right."        While Ambaasador to Colombia,  Braden made two 
trips to the United States,  during the apring of 1940 and 
1941.    On each trip he made a sojourn in New York City where 
he spoke to the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Com- 
mission and  to the American Arbitration Aaaooiation.    Braden 
56 
spoke to  the former April 11,   1940 on the  topic   "Arbitra- 
17 
tion and  Other Aspects of Inter-American Relations." 
On May 8,   1941 Braden spoke on the occasion of the dedica- 
tion of the American Arbitration Association's Headquarters 
18 
at Rockefeller Center.        When Spruille Braden eventually 
left the  State Department he played a more prominent role 
in arbitration. 
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CHAPTER 7 
WORLD WAR II AND THE CUBAN EMBASSY 
Aa he had on previous  occasions,   Spruille Brad en went 
to the State Department for  extensive  study to prepare him- 
self for his  new  Ambassadorial  post in  Cuba.     Breden  was 
soon to find out that there was something different at the 
State Department.     He knew that Nelson Rockefeller was the 
coordinator of the newly created Office of Inter-American 
Affaire.    He later discovered that the State Department had 
developed into e atate of bureaucratic disrepair.    He found 
It very difficult  to  locate  the   necessary documents  to 
complete his study of the island.    Before he left for Cuba 
Braden  felt  that he   wisely exacted a   promise   from Rocke- 
feller  that he not impose anything on Cuba without his 
knowledge or prior approval. 
Braden waa  to become ambassador  to  a country whose 
president,  Fulgenoio Batiata, had been labeled a dictator 
by an influential United Statea newapaper.    Batiste was 
to say of the stereotype,  that he waa making an effort to 
be a  "pro-Americen democratic dictator."      Spruille Breden 
and Fulgenoio Batiata would quarrel with eaoh other offic- 
ially and unofficially and they would, at the eeme time, 
be good frienda and develop a mutual reapeot end admiration, 
one for the other.    Mario Lazo,  the Cuban lawyer and author, 
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revealed a pro-Batista sentiment and spoke favorably of 
Spruille Braden in his book Dagger in the Heart.    He re- 
ferred to Braden as  "vigorous,  tough,  forthright to the 
point of bluntness, and a man of the highest prinoiples. 
Braden proved to be the antithesis of his predecessor." 
His predecessor  was  George Messeramith of whom we  will speak 
more later* 
When Braden arrived in Havana he found  that graft ran 
rampant in the Cuban bureeuoraoy and on all levels of pro- 
fessional life.     The political machinery of Cuba would have 
come to a halt if there had been no one  to grease the palm 
of an offloial hand.    But at that there was enough for Bra- 
den to complain about $ the task of completing official bus- 
iness was  painfully  slow.    After  assessing the  situation, 
Braden made it very clear that Americans in Cuba had better 
not be found engaging in transactions that were not com- 
pletely aboveboard.    One unfortunate North American waa 
caught  ethically  amiss and  found  himself handcuffed and 
removed from the island of Cuba by the Cuban government 
and through the arrangements of the United States Ambassa- 
4 
dor.      There was another oooasion that Spruille Braden had 
to take suoh action during his stay in Cuba.    An acquaint- 
ance of Braden's at Tale University was an executive for 
a lerge American firm in Cuba.    He boasted that he end 
Braden were college pale.    When Braden's  "pal" waa impli- 
cated in a Cuban kickback deal, Braden called the head of 
60 
the company in New York and brought about the man's sepa- 
ration from his company.    American involvement in graft 
ceased except  for  the  possible  exception of those who  oame 
to Braden and  asked  permission  to pay  a  bribe!     The  request 
was denied. 
When Braden came to Cuba he had many problems with 
which to contend.     German U-boats had sunk several Cuban 
vessels off the island.    Braden did not have the money to 
establish an  intelligence network,  although he  did  have  the 
promise that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
would be sent to the island to assist him.    Espionage exist- 
ed in Cuba and its source had to be found and eliminated. 
The answer to the  first problem lay within the domain of 
the Navy Department.    The needed intelligence foroe would 
be left to the resourcefulness of Braden.    Spruille Braden 
proved to be very  imaginative.    He enlisted the servioes of 
the writer Ernest  Hemingway,  who had  been  living in Cuba 
for a  few years.     Hemingway knew a great variety of people 
ranging from vagabonds to Spanish noblemen.    Braden knew 
that knowledge would be valuable and that Hemingway would 
probably be fascinated and co-operative.    Braden told him 
that there were 300,000 Spaniards living on the island and 
it was estimated  (by Prime Minister Saladrigaa) that up to 
30,000 of them were pro-fascist.      They would have to be 
watched particularly since it was not yet known if the 
Third Reich's maohinery would be geared toward the west. 
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Hemingway readily agreed to help and  then went about the 
task of recruiting priests, former bullfighters, gamblers, 
bartenders,  exiled dukes and counts and some Spanish loyal- 
ists.    According to Braden they did an excellent job keep- 
ing him up on information of which he would not normally 
have access.    When the Federal Bureau of Investigation came 
to Havana,  Braden wrote a letter to Hemingway thanking and 
commending him for his pstriotic actions.     There is a post- 
script to this story.     Hemingway came to Braden and demanded 
repayment for services  rendered.    The payment was to be in 
the form of a bazooka,  several machine guns and grenades, 
all to be used on his fishing boat.    Should a Nazi U-boat 
surface to buy his food, as had been a common practice, 
Hemingway intended to blast it from the water.    Braden went 
against the regulations end gave Hemingwey what he wanted. 
Fortunately Hemingway never had  the chance to sink a U-boat. 
The literary world benefited from that lack of opportunity 
and his death wish would have to be satisfied later. 
There were two major instances of espionage while Braden 
was in Cuba.    One involved Major Juan Govea who headed the 
Cuban radio.    Enough evidence gathered so tha c he could be 
removed from his position.    Batista would not have it.    It 
seema that Batista was involved with some gangsters,  one 
of whom was Oovea's brother.    On another occasion Major 
Govea was oaught making a broadcast in whioh he blatantly 
described the position,  cargo and tonnage of numerous 
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vessels in and around Guantanamo.    This time the new Prime 
Minister Ramon  Zaydin fired  Govea  without  consulting the 
President.    Later Batista was to atrip him of his rank as 
well.    He did  this  in hopes of achieving  rapprochement  with 
Brsden, with whom he had quarreled over the incident. 
The second case of espionage was detected by the Fed- 
eral Bureau of Investigation within the United States.     They 
were to place broadcasts they heard aa cooing from Havana. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation in Cuba handled the 
case with some Cuban assistance.    The spy's name was August 
Lu'ning.    He kept an apartment full of ohirping canaries  to 
cover the sound of his radio.     It was decided to let Mining 
continue to operate.    He was fed false information and it 
was hoped he would  lead them to other apiea.    They didn't 
count on General Manuel Benltez, the Cuban Chief of Police, 
to intercede in the matter.    Ben^tez had nothing to do with 
the locating of LUning but when he heerd of the spy's loca- 
tion he went over and arrested him and claimed full credit 
for his epprehension.    The well planned operation was 
destroyed.    General Ben/tez shall be heard from again 
shortly.    Aa for the now exposed Lu'ning, he was tried and 
convioted of espionage.    The deeth penalty oould be invoked 
under militery law but Batista heaitated to make that decia- 
ionj instead he asked Braden to decide for him.    Spruille 
Braden felt no qualms in sentencing him to death; although, 
he later stated  "I will oonfeas I found hie picture in the 
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paper a  bit  disturbing."       Technically this was an example 
of intervention   on  Braden's  part.     He accepted an  invitation 
to make a tough decision on a problem that Batista could 
not morally afford to relegate to a  surrogate.    It aeema 
clear that from the harsh way Braden dealt with the two 
Americans who questioned the sincerity of his spoken word, 
that Liining was to become an example to spies that the 
Americans,  in the form of Spruille Brad en,  would be diffi- 
cult to deal with and a new occupation might be in order. 
Liining as it turned out was the only man in all of Latin 
America to be executed for war crimes during the Second 
World War. 
Before Braden left Cuba a crisis arose in which an 
imminent coup d'etat threatened the stability of the island. 
Braden was asked to assist in the attempt to prevent the 
military take-over.    He refused as he felt any action he 
took would be construed as intervention but then he changed 
his mind on the rationale that his assistance would  really 
be intercession.     There waa an upcoming election to take 
place on June 1,  1944.    Pulgencio Batista deoided he would 
not run for re-election but would back his own man Carlos 
Saladrigaa for the presidency.    Running against  Saladrigas 
would be Ram6n Grau San MSrtfh, described by Braden as a 
leftist with a broad mass appeal.    Braden evaluated that 
appeal as being messianic and  spoke of people leading their 
aiok children up to him so that Orau's touch might heal 
6 
them. 
64 
As early as July of 1943,  Spxuille Bra den put out the 
word that Americana would not he allowed to contribute to 
the election.    For any monetary investment in either party 
could not help hut he construed as American intervention! 
an epithet Braden would just as soon save his country. 
Apparently Braden'a stiff ethical policy and  the  punishment 
for its violation were persuasive enough to prevent any 
untoward political contrihutions.    At the beginning it 
seemed certain that Saladrigas would be the new president. 
Even Braden was convinced of the outcome , scheduling a Wash- 
ington visit  for him for  discussions of United  States-Cuban 
problems.    The odds on Saladrigas* viotory were somewhere 
between  five and  six to one.    Then Grau began to grow in 
popularity  because  of his  charisma.     A few weeks  before  the 
election Saladrigas tried to reinforce his diminishing lead 
by touring the provinces.    His plan backfired because more 
and more of the electorate saw he lacked the megio perso- 
nality that his opponent had.    The tally of the June 1, 
1944 election read Saladrigas 857,230 and Grau 1,042,874, 
a 54 percent viotory over Grau in a reoord turnout eleotion. 
Perhaps the best  thing that oame from the election waa the 
popular belief that it was sn honest election, mostly due 
to America's lsok of intervention, a rarity in recent times. 
The faot that Cuba had had a rare honest eleotion did 
not prevent General Manuel Benftes from dialiking the 
results of the eleotion.    On June 3 Just two daya after 
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the polling Braden and his wife Maria were attending a 
dinner party when the vice president-elect and a newly 
elected senator approached Braden,  both of them uninvited 
to the party.     They had  to speak to Braden Immediately. 
Drawing him aside,  they told him that several Important 
military offloers nnd General Benftoz were Just outside 
Havana with the intent of forcibly wresting the power from 
President Batista and nullifying the election.    Braden was 
told he would have to intervene in the matter or there 
would be a violent revolution.    Braden appreciated the 
gravity of the situation but insisted he could not inter- 
vene, but then relented and offered to Intercede in behalf 
of the legitimate Cuban government saying that he was at 
Batista's command.     He went on to say that the United 
States government would not recognize any Cuban government 
other than the present one and the duly elected one to take 
office in October.    Any other Cuban government would not 
be recognized and the United States government would be 
compelled to quarantine Cuba in the form of America's ships 
blockading Cuban harbors disallowing any vessels to either 
enter or depart from Cuba.    Thia message was to be deliv- 
ered to President Batista and to the oonspirators. 
Apparently Braden's threst was enough to frighten many 
of the Army officers from Benftez's Intent.    Benftez did 
not give in immediately but attended a formal meeting held 
by Braden.    At that meeting Benftez several tiroes hurled 
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the appellative  "Cabron" toward Grau and Batista.    "Cabron" 
was a term that ascribed canine antecedents to the intended. 
Batista then  took action.    He fired Benltez from his job and 
the army.    Braden issued a hurried visa and Senor Benftez 
8 
departed for Miami. 
Ramon Grau San Martin became the next president of Cuba 
without further incident.    As president of Cuba he proved 
to be pro-American.    He wanted the already established United 
States military air bases to remsin in Cuba after the war 
to oontribute  to the defenses of the Americes and to extend 
9 
Cuban-American cooperation.       Even  Braden was delighted to 
see that Grau was doing a good  job not only in relation to 
the United States but in Cuba as well.    Grau was trying 
to create an honest government but in an effort to remove 
the crooked people from the previous administration Grau 
developed problems of his own.     In his zeal to replace 
offenders he was oharged with nepotism.    Urben violence 
increased.    Mass firings caused chaos in the government and 
Grau was deficient in the ability to delegate power. 
Braden saw only the beginning of the Grau administration 
for in the spring of 1945 he found himself embassador to 
troubled Argentina. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ARGENTINAi     "PERON o BRABEN" 
The issue of non-intervention defined at Montevideo 
was capable of causing many problems for American diplo- 
mats.    It had a great potential for inhibiting their ac- 
tions.    In order to keep himself as flexible as possible, 
Spruille Braden further interpreted the ooncept of non- 
intervention.     It was s nuance shared by President Roose- 
velt.    The idea was fairly simple.    A powerful oountry 
such as the United States would be in effect giving its 
tacit approval of a polioy practiced by another oountry 
if it did not intervene,  but this would have the effeot of 
influencing other countries and would thus be intervention. 
Slnoe the United States would be in the position of being 
damned if it did and damned if it did not she might as well 
intervene in her own interests.    The ambassador who under- 
atood and appreciated this interpretation need not feel 
shackled  in his duties. 
The Argentina to whioh Spruille Braden would beoome 
Ambassador was the most pro-Nazi nation in all of latin 
America.    Furthermore, Argentina had ambitions of unseating 
the United States as the dominant influenoe in I*tin Amerioa, 
On June 4,  1945 duly eleoted President Ramon Castillo fell 
from power as the result of a ooup d'etat.    At firat the 
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State Department considered this a blessing as Castillo was 
pro-Nazi but it was soon realized that the generals who now 
grasped the reins of power were more ardently pro-Nazi than 
was the President.    By January of 1944 the United States 
had reoeived conclusive evidence that Argentina had been 
involved in the fascist revolution in Bolivia,  that she wss 
receiving arms from Germany and that she had aggressive 
designs on other Latin American countries.    At the end of 
the month Secretary of State Hull announced that Argentine 
assets within the United States would be frozen.    Argentina 
aoted quickly breaking diplomatic relations with Germany 
in exchange for the release of her funds in the United 
States.     General  Ramfrez  who was now president did  not 
bother to oonsult with the other genersls on the action and 
they did not  look upon it favorably and thus Ramfrez was 
supplanted by Colonel Juan Peron and General Parrell who 
was made President but was Peron's puppet.    With this Hull 
asked other Latin Amerioan nations to withdraw recognition 
of Argentina as had the United States. 
In November of 1944 Cordell Hull retired as Secretary 
of State and Edward R.  Stettinius,  Jr., suooeeded him. 
Stettinius took a oonoiliatory stance in relation to Argen- 
tina.    Ultimately they were invited to Join the United 
Nations without having oomplied with the Chapultepeo Agree- 
ment established at the Mexioo City oonferenoe.    The agree- 
ment stipulated that the defensive alignment of the 
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hemisphere should be in accordance with the prevailing 
politioel principles. 
Although Rockefeller  sod  Stettinius personally asked 
Braden  to become  ambassador  to  Argentine,   it  is  rather 
certain that it was Roosevelt's appointment.    Rockefeller 
and Stettinius were not  likely to suggest such a rugged 
diplomat to perform  a  program of appeasement in Argentine. 
The faot is that they sent Avre Warren end  Lieutenant- 
General George Brett to Buenos Aires a month before Braden 
arrived end without his knowledge.     Their purpose was to 
evaluate the situation snd to creete a friendly atmosphere 
2 
for negotiations. 
Spruille Braden was to test his strength the moment 
he stepped off the plene in Buenos Aires.    He bed heard 
that a good friend of his, Enrique Gil,  publisher of the 
pro-Americen newspaper  la Semens, wee in jell being held 
incommunicado.     Braden arrived  in Buenos Aires in mid-Mey 
1945.    The wsr in Europe wss coming to en end end Argentine 
had found it expedient to declere wer on the Axis.    In 
oonjunotion with this sotion Peron found it neoeessry to 
oall for o state of siege so that he oould silenoe the din 
of dissidsnoe to the fascist regime.    Argentines were with- 
out their oonstitutionsl rights.      After deplaning Breden 
encountered several rsporters.     He ssid so they oould heer, 
"I wonder where my old friend Enrique Oil is?    I must look    ^ 
him up soon."    A few hours later Oil was released from jail. 
Apparently the fascist Peron oould bs intimidsted. 
• 
71 
The next few days ID Buenos Aires consisted of fulfill- 
ing the obligatory duties of protoool.    He was  taken to the 
Case Rosada, the Argentine White House, to present his cre- 
dentials to President Parrell.    He spoke at a press confer- 
ence where reporters were shocked to find that Braden's 
policy would not he that of Brett's and Warren's.    He stated 
that America had been involved in World War II to provide 
defense for representative  government around  the world and 
that it felt compelled to do the same during peaoe tine. 
Braden was to meet Juan Domingo Peron for the first tine. 
The Colonel had something on his mind.    He wented the United 
States to help Argentina develop military parity with her 
huge neighbor Brazil.    He pointed out that the United States 
had not given her  military aid during the war.    He did not 
mention that Argentina sided with the Axis st the time. 
Braden told him that before such, a consideration oould be 
taken by the United Ststes,  Argentina would have to comply 
with the Chapultepeo Agreement.    The first meeting with 
Peron was  cordial. 
The seoond meeting between Braden and Per6*n waa held 
on June 1.     This time the Argentine Vioe President seemed 
conciliatory toward Braden's demands.    Braden spoke to Peron 
not as an ambassador,  but as an Amerioan friend.     He told 
hin that in order for him to get what he wanted from Amarioe 
he would have to reotify what Amerioana oould not abide 
about Argentina.    There were 1,203 political prisoners in 
72 
Argentine jails.     They would have to bo released.    Censor- 
ship had been imposed on both Argentine radio and press. 
Those restrictions had  to be lifted.    One final stipula- 
tion existed end that was that Argentina oust turn over to 
the United States and her allies all Nazi agents and their 
assets in Argentina.     Pero'n agreed to lift the state of 
siege and to appoint representatives to seek out and appre- 
hend Nazi agents.     Pero'n had a request to be made slso; he 
asked that certain American journalists be Bilenoed from 
writing lies about himself and Argentina.    Bra den said that 
he would see to it that any American  journalist that wrote 
an untruth about Argentina would be made to reoant publicly 
or would be exposed as a liar.     On the other hand a journa- 
list would be permitted a free hand to print anything that 
was uncovered and was  factual.     Braden and Pero'n parted 
oordially. 
Peron seemed to be sincere  in his acquiescence.    Within 
a few weeks all the politioal prisoners had been released. 
Ptron also saw to it that censorship be removed from the 
Argentine media.       These positive signs toward a democratic 
acoeptance threatened to dissolve on June 29, the date of 
the third meeting between Braden and PerSn.    Braden entered 
Peron's office after a notable laok of pomp and oeremony 
which aooompanied him on the previous visits.     The Viee- 
Prealdent roughly ordered Braden to sit down.    He then 
aocuaed him of being part of a oonspirsoy to undermine 
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the present Argentine regioe.    He said that euoh activi- 
ties oust oease as he had many fonotioel followers who were 
extreme enough to assassinate anyone they felt night he 
doing him hern.    The point wee oleer.    Brsden and other 
trouble makers were being officially informed that their 
persistence might result in death.    Since the  state of siege 
bad been relaxed the clamor against the fascist regime had 
grown and was no longer limited to the foreign press.    Bra- 
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den vehemently protested this blatant threet.      He told 
feron that Argentina was obligated to proteot every American 
in the oountry.    Per on said it was not obligated to proteot 
Americans  under  the  oiroumstsnoes  implying that Americans 
ware responsible for their eotions end would reep the just 
consequences.     Brsden left the Vice-President'e office 
when it became  obvious   that  he would  remain adamant on the 
•ubjeot.    Whan Braden returned to the em bossy his staff 
members reported severel phone cells from Ameriosn reporters 
saying their lives had been threetened.    Protests to the 
Argentine Foreign Minister snd to the Argentine Asbeaaedor 
in Washington were msde.    On July 5 the foreign Minister 
informed Braden that meseuros were being token to proteot 
Anerioana in Argentine.    Just to be sure,  Brsden wee assigned 
an F.B.I, men as bodyguard. 
After the oommotion of PerSn'e threets died down the 
Colonel ettempted several times, half-heartedly, to gein 
rapproohement with Braden end on eech oese it would hove 
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meant a compromise of Braden'a dignity.    He therefore 
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declined.      July would prove to be a spectacular month in 
the battle between Brad en and Per6*n.    After the time Braden 
brought about the release of politioal prisoners and the 
resumption of the freedoms of the press and radio Argentina 
became a country seething with turmoil.    The Latins of 
Argentina for the first time in yeara oould identify with 
the democratic ideology and Spruille Braden was their hero 
as he had made it all possible by intimidating the  fascist 
regime into restoring their constitutional rights.     Braden 
became known as  "El Dormedor de Coroneles" or  "the Tamer 
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of Colonels."       People in all walks of life olsroored for 
the overthrow of the fascists. Thsy participated in riots 
denouncing the regime. People were killed and many others 
Injured in clashes with the army and polioe. 
By the middle of July Preaident Parrell announoed 
that an election would be held by the end of the year.     (It 
aotually took place in February of 1946.)    It was to be the 
first election in Argentina since  1958.    It waa important 
that Argentina have an eleotion.     The election would help 
soothe the angry sentiments of the people toward the cur- 
rent regime and it would also be in oomplianoe with the 
Chapultepeo Agreement.     Soon after Parrell's revelation a 
great oataatrophe whioh had reoently ooourred in Chile was 
exploited end with the influenoe of Peronista propaganda 
75 
served to considerably diminish Braden's mass appeal in 
Argentina,  temporarily. 
The Braden Ooppar Company lost 500 of its Chilean 
niners when a fire broke out in a mine, entrapping its 
viotios.    The nine had belonged to William Braden, Spru- 
llle's father,  who had sold all interests in the mine in 
1912.    The Braden Copper Mines of Chile now belonged to 
the Kenneoott Company.     This did not deter the printing of 
handbills and posters defaming Braden in various ways.    It 
Mae called  "the Breden orime!"    Posters spoke of the Chlle- 
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ans as "viotims of the Bra dens."        it evoked the old 
American imperialism likening it to Roosevelt's Good Neigh- 
bor Policy and spoke of "the strong and haughty dollar." 
Printed was a spurious quote by Braden.    It said that he 
would "tame" Argentina inside a month.    The attack became 
slightly ludiorous when Brsden was compared to an 11 Capons 
trying to blackmail Argentina.    During the height of the 
propagande war agalnat Braden on July 20, a memorial cere- 
mony for the dead miners was held at a theatre.    Leaflete 
condemning Braden were showered on the audience from the 
balcony.    Cries of "Throw out the Yankee pig" and  "Death 
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to Braden"      oould be heard throughout the theatre.    Appar- 
ently the whole oampaign egainst Braden waa finanoed by the 
government.     It was too massive end therefore too costly to 
nave been sponsored by some fanatios.     Polioe eupport was 
even seen to be lent  to the movement.     A Buenos Aires 
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ordinanoe forbad* the distribution of handbills on the 
streets of the  city but  distributors  under  polioe sorutiny 
passed theo out with impunity and police were even seen to 
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take part In their distribution. 
On July 21 Braden was to speak at the University of 
the Litoral in Santa Fe'.    Maria and Spruille Braden traveled 
by train.    On reaohing their destination they found the sta- 
tion platform strewn with leaflets denouncing Braden for 
the Chilean tragedy.     That evening Braden spoke to enthus- 
iastic students on the topio  "The Good Neighbor Policy." 
In it he traoed Amerioan  policy toward latin Amerioa begin- 
ning with the Monroe Doctrine and ending it with en expla- 
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nation of Roosevelt's policy.        His treatment and popular- 
ity at the University heartened bin for his return to 
Buenos Aires.     When the Bradens returned to the oapltal they 
found three thousand demonstrators awaiting them at the sta- 
tion.    All were pro-Brsden and pro-Amerioan and they demon- 
strated in repudiation of the Braden smear.    Saavedra lamas 
was in the orowd. He took Maria Braden*a arm and escorted 
her to an awaiting oar.    They were told thet a larger dem- 
onatration awaited them within the oity.    At this point 
Braden felt he had been exonereted by the people and their 
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faith in him. 
Braden was to have identified the souroe of hla^attaok 
■a being "instigated by foreigu end Hasi elementa." How- 
•▼«, la his memoirs Braden said  "the entire ooetly attaok 
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had been planned and oarried out by Coamuniata working from 
the top floor of the preaidentlal paleoe....Per6'n and the 
Communists were working hand in glove and forming a menao- 
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log alliance." He bad  received  information  from Ambassa- 
dor Alfonso Quintana Burgos of Chile, who at one time wea 
in charge of the Chilean police as Minister of the Interior. 
Braden had aa early aa July 5 sent  "top secret" oeblee to 
President Truman  (President Roosevelt died before Braden 
could take his poat in Argentina) and  Secretary Of State 
James F. Byrnes,  who had  recently succeeded Stettiniua. 
He told of the Communist activities he waa aware of and 
wanted the Secretary and President to question Joaeph Sta- 
lin at the upooBing Potsdam Conferenoe ebout Communist 
interest in Latin America and their friendliness toward 
Peron.    Braden never reoeived a reply to hie cables.    A 
year later he wea to find out that they were never deliv- 
ered.    Braden felt that hia messages were intercepted by a 
Communist in the State Department. The belief expressed 
by Braden that the Fascists and Communists oonsplred 
together in Argentina ia unaubatantiated elsewhere end 
seems to have oome into exiatenoe in the yeera efter he 
20 
left the Argentine embassy. 
Braden'a popularity remained et a high after Peron'a 
oaapaign to diaoredit him failed.    By the middle of Auguat 
Jaaee p. Byrnea made preparationa for aignifioant ohangee 
in the state Department.    Helaon Bookefeller ooundly 
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denounoed  the aotivities  of the  Argentine   government.     He 
then resigned ee Assistant Secretary for Latin American 
Affaire.     Byrnes  aooepted  the   resignation  and  nominated 
Sprullle Braden to the poet.    Byrnes'  action wee a repudia- 
tion of the Stettiniua-Rookefeller Latin American and,  in 
partioular,  Argentine policy.    The difference between the 
Braden and Rockefeller policies was the differenoe between 
their interpretations of non-intervention.    Rockefeller ohoae 
to take the striot interpretation and remain ailant in rela- 
tion to Argentina and tacitly approve of the  faaoiat regime. 
He even went BO far as to invite Argentine to the Sen Fran- 
cisco Conference before they complied with the pre-requleite, 
the Ghapultepeo  Agreement.     Braden'a  interpretation  of non- 
intervention would not allow ailent approval.        By uaing 
binding legalletio reminders auoh as Argentina'a adoption 
of the teneta of the  Mexico City conference,  Braden had 
exacted a cessation of the terrors evoked by the state of 
siege and helped bring about a democratic election. 
When Byrnea telephoned Breden end  told him he wented 
him to come  to Washington as Assistent Seoretery he found 
that the ambassador  was reluotant to take that poet.    Braden 
felt that hia job in Argentina wee not oomplete but thet 
progreae wea being made and  thet he would be of greeter 
use in Buenos Aires  than Waehington.    Byrnee was adament 
•nd ao Braden wee virtuelly ordered to leeve.    He ssid he 
would end managed  to deley hie departure until the end of 
22 
September. 
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Brad en'H  last weeks  in Argentina  involved  several 
speech-making oooasions.    During the last week in August 
Bra den apoke at a luncheon given in hi a honor by the 
Argentine-American Institute of Culture.    His speeoh waa 
described as a  "pledge of Anerioan friendship and a philip- 
pio againat totalitarianism."    In hie apeeoh Braden made e 
nockery of the  fascist regime of Argentine without resort- 
ing to naming names   (whenever Braden mede public atateaenta 
about Fascism within Argentina he never identified culprits, 
feeling that this would constitute  intervention| whereaa hie 
speeches were such that only the most obvious would be 
unaware of whom he spoke).    His speeoh sroused many "bravos" 
and much laughter from the animated audience.    He ended his 
speeoh with a powerful declaration t 
...Nobody should  think that my transfer to Weshington 
will mean  the  abandonment  of the   task which I am 
oarrying on.     The voioe of liberty ha a alwaya made 
itself heard in this land and  I believe that no one 
oan suffocate it.    I shall hear it from Washington 
with the aame olarity with whioh I hear it here in 
Buenos Aires.     I know it to be the voioe of the 
Argentine people...whioh...is oalling for a new life, 
baaed on oonfidenoe and mutual reapeot.    If during my 
stay with you I have reapeoted faithfully the feeling 
of the people of the United states—whioh is no way 
different from that of the government—I hope to oe 
able to interpret with equal faithfulneea,  onoe I 
reaoh Waahington,  the feelinge of the Argentine 
people.*3 
Braden wee to hold  true to his speeoh when he returned to 
America aa Assistant Seoretery of Stete for letin Amerioan 
Affairs. 
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pour days before the Bxadens were to depart from Argen- 
tina a huge  demonstration  was  organized.     The   "March of 
Liberty and constitution" proved to be the largest demo- 
cratic  demonstration ever in all of Latin  Amerioa.    A half 
Billion people turned out for this oooaaion.    The cry for 
Democracy was growing to a crescendo and the faaoiet regime 
was in dire atralta.     Three days after Braden left Buenos 
Aires for Washington,  Argentines were once again victimized 
24 
by the state of siege. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SPRUILLE BRADEN AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
Spruille  Braden'a  Senate  confirmation as Assistant 
Secretary of Stats for Latin Aosrioan Affairs was sohioyed 
after sons  diffioulty.     Brad en  made  it  dear  that his pol- 
icy in Argentina  was anti-fssoist and that those who opposed 
his handling of the situation wers putting themselves in 
the position of lending sid to a fascist regime.    This dis- 
tinction put the vots in Brsden's favor. 
One of the fir at things Spruills Bradan was to do sren 
before his  confirmation  was to oanosl  the   Inter-American 
Confersnoo on Pesoe snd Security whioh had been planned for 
Bio de Janeiro on October 20,  1945.    The purpose of the 
conference wes to gather  the twenty-one Pen Aosrioan 
republioa together so thst they might re-oonfirm the wer- 
tise Mexico City and Ohapultepeo Agreements and sake then 
a permanent hemispheric ssourity psot.    Ths resson for its 
cancellation was thst Argentina was to be pert of this psot 
and she still oontinusd to rensgs on ths adherenoe to the 
2 
original agreement.      Although Braden took the reeponsi- 
bility for the cancellation of the conference, it wes 
President Truman who made the deoiaion aa early as Septem- 
ber 29, even before Braden rsturnsd to Washington.    Despite 
this fact Braden*s detraotors aooussd him of hering influ- 
3 
enoed the President's dscisloc. 
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After Braden left Argentina,  developments unfolded 
rapidly.    PerSn reinstituted the  state of siege to quell 
the mounting olamor  for  democracy.     Some  2,000 Argentines 
were immediately  imprisoned,   including Carlos  Saavedra 
IAMB.    All civil liberties were revoked.     Peron'a polioe 
force, known for their brutality,  clamped down on the peo- 
ple.      Insteed of this eotion causing dissent to silenoe 
it grew loud in defiance of brutalities.    Argentine wee on 
the verge of civil war.     Several ailitary officers deoided 
to take matters into their own hands.     On Ootober 9 they 
forced Peron to resign as Tioe President of Argentine end 
he wee to be banished to Martin Garcfa island.    Having 
aooompliahed the removal of Peron from offioe the offioere 
set ebout the taek of organising a new government.    Inepti- 
tude and division within their ranks osused repeeted failure. 
While the officers remained disorganised, Peron'I loyel 
foroes rsllied to his oeuse.     Perbn had mede the laborer 
his favorite while in offioe, end now in hie abeence they 
demonstrated in support of him.    The polioe too remeined 
loyal to Perb'n.     Chaoa in the government and a  eignifioent 
populaoe vooal for their former leeder compelled Preeident 
Psrrell to return PerSn to power.    He returned end reoeived 
hie full euthority on Ootober 17,  1945, end on that eeme 
dsy announced his presidential oendideoy. 
The campaigning began elmoat immedietely efter Peron-e 
return.    He established the new Partido leboriate or the 
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labor party.    His opposition was JOBS  P.  Tanboriol, repre- 
senting the Union Demooratioa Party.    Tamborlni was a little 
known and  colorless  senator who was  to provide  token resis- 
tance to the Peronistas'   juggernaut.    Actually as things 
stood in October any oppoaltion to Peron had good reason to 
believe  that they Bight be eleoted.    The democratic euphoria 
aroused by Bra den was atill being felt but the election was 
not scheduled until February 24,  1946.    There was enough tiae 
for aoods to change and events to ooour to alter opinions. 
When Peron began his campaigning he tried to find an 
external evil that by Its condemnation night unify Argen- 
tina in his favor.    Ho found s foreign demon but it did not 
carry much olout.    He attaoked the aoney-hungry British 
and North American capitalists.    He attaoked the United 
States in general as the dreaded  -colossus of the North." 
He had previously ststed that due to Spruille Brad en's 
rabble-rousing he was exiled and alowst comBittsd to polit- 
ioel oblivion.     Per on's triumphant return to power edded a 
new dimension of ohsrisms or magic to hie personslity whioh 
had foraerly relied mostly on his SBple aaohiaBO, no BBBII 
quality in a latin Aaerioan diotator-politioian.      SOBS of 
the Peronistas resorted to what had beooBe a oomnon praotioe 
end that was to become the party thst ohsBpioned the perse- 
cution of the Jews,    polioenen wstohed indifferently aa Jews 
were kioked, beaten, stoned, end Baimed.    Posters read 
'Xill . j.w and be m PBtriot!-8    Mobs shouted -Desth to the 
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9 
jews!"    and indeed many were killed.    One of Peron'a depu- 
ties offered that  "it was a pity a onion, larger number of 
10 
jews weren't killed."        On December 21, Colonel Per6n 
officially denounoed the anti-Samitlo activities stating 
that the offenders were  "outside all democratic  stan- 
11 
darde,"      a strange phraseology for a  fascist dictator. 
As late aa a few weeks before the eleotion politioal 
observers were predicting s Tamborinl-Union Demooratioa 
victory, but Tamborini's foroea sensed an increase in 
Feron's popularity.     They began to look toward the north 
for the aid Spruille Braden promised.    Brsden waa in the 
process of preparing a document that would onoe end for all 
oauae the Argentine repudiation of Juan Peron.     It waa 
titled Consultation Among the Anorloan Renublioa with Be- 
apoot to the Argentine Situation.     It became known aa the 
Blua Book.    In it,  the book relates many examplee in whioh 
the Argentine  junta  supported Nazi interests in Argentina, 
allowing that Vice-President Peron waa among those who 
assisted in lending aid to the enemies of democracy. 
Eighty-six pagea of quantitative and qualitative evidence 
was preaented to show that the then ourrent Argentine regime 
«•■ in league with the German Hasis.        This State Depart- 
■ant document was  prepared and diatributed throughout latin 
Aaarioa just two weeks prior to the Pebruary 24 eleotion in 
Argentina.    As it turned out,  the Blue Book proved to be 
the instrument by whioh Peron would aeoure the preaidenoy. 
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He treated the Blue Book ae an example of the notorious 
intervantionism  practiced  by the  North Americana.     He went 
on to Identify Braden aa a  typical American in that re- 
spect, which Justifiably served to tarniah hia democratic 
halo.    Finally,  Pertfn applied the coup d'grace in hia 
counter attaok.    He made Braden his oppoeition to the 
Argentine presidency by oreating the slogan J   "Per6*n o 
Braden."    Its implications were clears    Do you want an 
Argentine or e United  States oitiaen ruling Argentina? 
Most important It did much to eliminate Jose'' Temborlni aa 
a Tiable presidential candidate.     After all Spruille Braden 
had not picked on him.    There la no hard evidence to ex- 
plain what role the Blue Book played in the outoome of the 
eleotion but the consensus wea that if it played a role et 
all it did so in the favor of Peron.        At the end of the 
balloting PerSn reoeived 1.5 million votes to 1.2 million 
votes for Tamborini.     Peron'a Partido Laborlate won two- 
thlrda of the aeata in the Houae of Deputiea and all but 
two Senete seats.    Per6n had won 56 peroent of the rote 
and Tamborini 44 peroent,  but the margin in the eleotoral 
oollege was even higher.    PerSn reoeived 304 eleotoral votes 
to 72 for Tamborini.14    Braden related,  ironioslly,   -I knew 
that by hook or by crook he would win."        He did not add 
that he had  provided the hook by which Peron would la ten on 
to viotory. 
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Peron's polltioal victory ID Argentina was nore than 
just s mandate   by  the  electorate.     It symbolised a  viotory 
over Yankee imperialism and to Peron it meant e peraonal 
victory over his antagoniat Spruille Bra den.    In a way 
Argentina proved to be the zenith and the nedir in Breden's 
career.    He enjoyed his work there feeling that hie attaok 
on faaoism was  justified.     He received positive reenforoe- 
aent from the Argentines but not by the bulk of those on 
Capitol Hill.    He was bound to have found it ironio that 
his government would endorse the Chapultepeo agreement end 
then turn around end ebrogate it in the appeasement of e 
nation whose political ideology we a similar to that of 
the nations against whom World War II had been fought.    He 
was made to leeve Argentina  before hie job wes complete 
and bis efforts to finish his task from Washington proved 
diaastrous.     Strangely enough the eleotion of 1946 has been 
called the most honest in Argentine history, whioh served 
to vindioete Pero*n but not his Yenkee edversery.    George I. 
Blanksten in his Park's Argentine etteapts to single out 
Braden's primary miatake.    He pointe out that World War II 
was virtually over when Breden errived in Argentine.    The 
Axis had already expired but Breden peraieted aa if the 
war were still aotive and faaoieta repreaented the princi- 
pal threat to democracy when the legitimate concern of the 
United Stetea was communism. Thia may not be e wholly 
Proper oritioiam of Braden in Argentina,  but he wee to stete 
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in his MBOirs that when he beoame Assistant Seoratary of 
17 
Stata ha felt fairly naive about ooanunlaa.        Spruille 
Bradan received great auooeaa and adulation in Argentina! 
later it would prove to be the greet failure of his oareer. 
Hie remaining time in the State Department would not pro- 
gress auoh better and it would oauae e permanent ohange in 
bis politioal outlook. 
The United States did not immediately repleoe Spruille 
Bradan with an ambassador to Argentina.    On February 26, 
1946, President  Truman naned George Measersmith aa the new 
ambassador--the man whom Braden replaood in Cuba.    Meaaer- 
amlth was to go to Argentina and oauae a lot of trouble 
but not for the Argentinea and not in the way that Spruille 
Bradan caused trouble.    Meaeeremith waa oritioiaad for rep- 
resenting "the Peron point of view in Waahington rather 
aora ardently than hla own governments point of view in 
Buanoa Airea."        He even went on to refer to Peron as being 
a "True Denoorat."    He felt no qualua about oontradioting 
Seoratary of State Byrnea publioly and even Bending a 
10,000-word diatribe about hie superior, Spruille Braden, 
to a publiaher.19    It aeoae that George Meeaereaith repre- 
sented the opinion of eome that Pan Aaerioan aolidarity wea 
paraoount even at the expense of paying obeiaanoe to a 
reoaloitrant nation.    The United Statea Aray and Navy shared 
the viewa of Messorsmith.    Deapite the foot that the Argen- 
tine government more oloaely reaeabled Peaoiaa than any 
90 
other form of government and  they still harbored sought- 
after Nazis,  the Army and  Navy were in favor of shipping 
arms to Argentina as part of a heoiephere defenae poliey 
that would standardize the various armies of the heals- 
phsre along United   States  military  lines,   teohnologically 
and methodologically.     It would be done in such s wsy so sa 
not to disturb the prevailing balance of power in Latin 
Aeerica.    Argentina had now voiced her ambition to reeoh 
parity with Bresil militarily.    Brasil reoeived ailitery aid 
during the wer whan her troops joined the United Steteo 
fifth Army in Italy.    Argentina took no active role in 
World War II for the Allied cause.    Furthermore Argentine 
had abrogatsd the Havana Conference Agreement of 1940 whioh 
was a defenae paot oelling for the mutual aid of Amerioen 
rapublios after Pearl Harbor.    Argentine eought to estsb- 
lish a bloo of neutrela.    Deepite having a long liat of 
reasons for not giving militsry sid to Argentina the Army 
and the Navy took the stance that if we ga*e Argentina 
what it wanted it might etart aeeing thinge as the United 
States ssw them.    Oeorge Meesersmith took this same posi- 
tion in Argentina.    In the spring of 1946 Congress prsvented 
the pesssge of the  "Inter-Amsriosn Militery Oooperetion 
Aot."       m effeot it repudieted Oeorge Messsrsmith ss 
oil.   At the same time Spruille Braden'e policy waa exon- 
erated. 
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Spruille Bra den was ultimately to reaign from the State 
Department over the Argentine issue.    On April 1,  1946, 
president Truman issued s memorandum to the Aserioan repub- 
lics stating that ha was willing to renew dlsoussions furth- 
ering the aoooBpliahnentB of Mexloo Citj and Chapultepeo. 
Braden was not involved in the formulation of this seooran- 
dua nor was he advised aa to ita eziatenoe until it beoese 
21 
public knowledge. Two days later Braden resigned his 
State Department position.     President  Truman'a aotion was 
tantamount to firing Braden for it indloated a repudiation 
of hie Argentine policy.     Less than a year previous to that 
the President had asked Braden to draft a memorandum out- 
lining the United states'  attitude oonoerning the Argentine 
situation.    The memorandum read aa Braden had ezpreased it 
while he was Ambassador   to Argentina.    The United Stetes 
would not do business with a nation that waa eaeentielly e 
fasclet regime and one that would oonoeal eneaiea of the 
allied effort in World War II.     The sore reoent semorenduB 
reTeraed the former and weloosed with open ersa the etill 
reoaloitrant Argentina to the Rio Oonferenoe. 
The President'a change in attitude waa not a vindi- 
cation of oeorge Messsrssjith'e Argentine polioy per se. 
George Marahall, ths new Seoretery of Steta (Byrnee reaigned 
in January of 1947),  fired Meeaersmith fros his post or 
rather eooaptad his resignstion without his having submitted 
one.    Braden*a reaignation would not be official until 
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June 30.    Before that time he would reoeive America'a 
highest civilian award,  the Medal of Freedom.    Tradition 
held that the President would award this most prestigious 
niedal.    But  when  Sprullle  Breden received  the  medal it wae 
pinned to hie lapel by Under  Secretary of Stete Bean loheaon 
22 
and had to be oonaidered a alight of protocol. 
Sprullle Braden wae to leave the Stete Department e 
disillusioned aan.     In 1971 he reveeled in his memoirs 
that while in the State Department he notloed many curious 
things afoot.    Subordinates seemed to be running the entire 
department.    He aeid he wae eware of e movement to hare him 
replaced at his post or shored aside end rendered ineffec- 
tual.    He charged  that there were e  number  of communists  in 
the Department at the tine.    In 1954 Sprullle Breden eppeered 
before e Senate aubooomittee analyzing oommunist infiltra- 
tion.    Braden gave testimony oonoerning the time ha spent 
in Washington in serrioe of the State Department.    He mode 
the charge that then  (during the Eisenhower administration) 
there were holdorera in the State Department from the time 
of the Truman edminiatration that  "are atill bending United 
States foreign policy to fit the Kremlin pettern."        He 
added that there had  not been muoh ohange einoe he left 
in 1947.    On the topio of ooamunlsm Sprullle Breden oould 
epaak out aa a militant propagandist filled with oliohea 
•nd rhetoric    In e stetement in whioh he deaoribed hia 
93 
iapreasions as to the depth of oommuniat infiltration in 
the State Department Braden said,  "My feeling was there 
wore relatively few Communists, but there were an awful lot 
of state  interventionists,   collect!vists, "do  goodera," 
aisinformed idealists and what not,  that were easily led 
24 
and were in affeot the puppets of the unknown."        Such, a 
description would seem to describe e  Satanic plot aa well 
as communist machinations within the State Department. 
Braden never ssld  so but it would appear that he held these 
"Puppets of the unknown" responsible for his timely depart- 
ure from the Washington soene.    To Spruille Breden the 
Communists were a far more pernicious lot than were the 
Fascists.     Fascists oould be quiokly and easily labelled 
as suoh but not so the Communists.    Take for example Fidel 
Caatro who since the mid-fifties fought for what seemed a 
deaooratio revolution only to reveal, in 1961, after he 
waa viotorioua that he waa a MSrxiet-Leniniet.    Spruille 
Braden would virtually spend the reat of hia aotive life in 
a oruaade ageinat Communism. 
Although there had been several ohangea in key person- 
nel in the State Department the underlinga had remained 
basioally the aame end it wea thia  "anonymoue" ataff that 
oontrolled the State Department, Breden olaiaed.    He went 
on to explain how from Seoretary of State Byrnea to John 
Joatar Dullea this State Department oonapiraoy prevented 
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them from running the Department.    They were Bade to keep 
goring from the United Nations to paying oalle on foreign 
ministers and onoe at the State Department they were con- 
fronted with some  important  decision8  that  needed  immediate 
attention.    Often the Seoretary would aign a doouaent 
without having read it in its entirety and this was how 
underlings night determine State Department polioy.    Brad en 
stated that he was amaaed how a  "young Soviet" aa he oalled 
then, oould walk into his office with aeemingly the none 
authority a a his own and would over-rule e deoiaion of 
25 
his. 
One of the anonymous ateff membera in the State 
Department while Bra den waa there later beoame a contro- 
versial figure, and the name llger Hiaa beoeme well known. 
in his memoirs,  Braden atated that the Federal Bureeu of 
Investigation oiroulated a report among high ranking offic- 
ials within the State Department identifying oertain gov- 
ernment employeea aa Comrnnnlats.    One of theee wea Alger 
Hiss.    Perhaps the Federal Bureau of Inveatigation waa re- 
miss but Sprullle Braden omitted the inoluaion of the 
damning evidence aa wall.2      In hie teatimony before the 
Senate auboommlttee Braden detailed an incident of large 
proportiona within the State Department involving hiaaelf 
•ad Alger Hiaa.    The incident, cf internstionel aoope, 
took plaoe in 1946 and involved American military basee in 
the Panama Oanal Zone.    A United Statea agreement with 
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Panama which allowed 134 military installations for defense 
of the Panama  Canal provided for  the  removal of the  wartime 
defense base* one year after a peaoe pact waa signed.    The 
peaoe treaty waa not yet signed but Russia made anti- 
Aaerioen propaganda  out of the bases.    They suggested Pan- 
ama was an oooupied territory and aroused Panamanians 
to deaand the removal of the bases.    Aooording to Brad en, 
Hies inaiated that a routine report be aubaitted to the 
United Nations explaining the preaenoe of the bases in 
Panama.    Braden aaid he aaw no sense in submitting the 
report,  that  "It waa juat going to enrege the Panaman- 
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lens."       Braden would not approve auoh aotlone ao Hiss 
appealed to Under Seoretary of State Dean Aoheaon end won 
approval.    Aoheaon would not even listen to Braden'e pleas. 
Braden deeoribed the eftereath of the report to the united 
Nationst 
Iaegine my utter eatoniahaont when one morning I 
pioked up the Weehington Poet end here on the front 
page was an announcement that we had reported to 
the United Hationa on the Oenel Zone ee •■"•***•* 
territory.    When I reed that, I reelieed **•*»•■ 
reelly putting fat in the fire in our "l?"00" 
with Panama in the aubatantietion of tt*,**8,8*" 
ellegetiona end in our reletiona with all JJJJJ     28 
American republioa.     It waa auoh a naaty aituation. 
The faot la that Braden heerd of the oontente of the 
report through the newapeper.    He wea never oonaulted ebout 
the finished produot nor wae he eaked to edviae on ite 
Pteparetion.    Braden ruehed to the Stete Department 
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immediately after reading the artiole.    Ha asked the souroe 
of the report and waa told that it had emanated from the 
Office of Special Politioal Affaire which waa headed by 
Alger Hiaa.    Braden went on to say that the military bases 
in the Canal Zone had  to be relinquished by the United 
States ee e result of the Stete Department.    At the tine 
Spruille Breden waa giving his testimony, Alger Hiss was 
serving 8  five-year   jell sentence for perjuring himself in 
denial of passing on government  aeoreta to Soviet spies. 
Braden must hare felt vindicated by the oonriotlon of 
29 
Hiss. This  vindication would  carry Breden  far in the 
future—fer to the right. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DENOUEMENT 
In 1947»  much to Spruille Bra den's chagrin, a book 
appeared out  of  the  Dominican  Republic  oharging hio with 
being a communist and intriguing with oomraniate through 
ouch of Latin America.     It was an absurd  book filled with 
oany unsubstantiated charges and erroneous faota.    Braden 
was oontraated against the author*a Hat of those  "orowned 
with o halo of dignity and loyalty, the poetulatea of 
Deaooraoy."    Included in that liat were auoh names as 
Genera la Bieenhowar and Marehall, Oeorge Meaaeranith, 
Rafael Trujillo and Juan Peron. 
The author of thia spurious diatribe on Braden wea 
Joel Pepper, a yaneaualan.    An argument oan be offered that 
Pepper may have  bean  commissioned  to write  I Aoouae Braden 
by Rafael Trujillo,  the dlotator of the Doainioen Republic 
TrujUlo spoke of a   "Coawuniat oonapiraoy ageinet the Doain- 
ioen Republic since  1945. *    Trujillo alleged that aaong the 
ooaauniat conspirators waa Spruille Braden.    It eeene that 
the official nomenclature for a critic of the Trujillo 
regime waa  -ccemniat- and that Spruille Breden earned that 
•ppellatira in 1945 whan aa Assistant Secretary of State 
for letin American Affaire ha denied a Doainican requeet 
to buy 20,000,000 A-erioan oartridgaa.    Braden offered three 
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reasons fox denying the sales     (1) the ammunition would be 
directed against the Lominioan people or a neighboring 
republic i  (2) it would not prove to be an addition to 
continental defense|   (3) the bulleta would not serve to 
facilitate Demooraoy in the Dominican Republic      Bra den 
made an enemy in the Dominican Republio end two jeera later 
a book waa published there eoouaing his of being a oossuniat. 
BesideB being involved with the Argentine problem and 
the "communists" in the State Department,  Spruille Breden 
wrote end spoke on various topioa relevant to hie Stete 
Department post.    On sose ooossions he spoke as the Under 
Seoretary of State and during others he apoke aa Spruille 
Braden.    Both voices were illuminating.    In 1946 Breden 
published sn article titled "letin Aserioen industrialism* 
tion and Foreign Trade $" in it he explaina what la needed to 
be done by Letin Amerioana to bring their various eoonosiea 
to a relative par with those of Horth Aserioen countries. 
Braden worked from the premise thet whet ia good for Latin 
America is good for the United Stetes.    He felt that it ia 
essential that Latin Amerioa beoose induatrialised for her 
own good end for ours.    He pointed out thet the United 
States exports more to Oenede ennuslly thsn it does to 
latin Aserios slthough the letter has ten times the pop- 
ulation of the former,    the difference between Oeneda and 
latin Amerioe relative to United Stetee importa ia not one 
of location but rather industrislisstion.    Csnsds is 
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industrialised whereas Latin Aserioe ia not.    The country 
that produoea sore sells sore end therefore oen buy or 
iiport sore.    Breden epoke ea a liberal when ha wrotet 
Lest there be e sieunderetending on thie aoore, we 
wlah to emphasise that the United States government 
rejeots the view that the industrialisation and 
diversification of the Latin-Aaerloen economies are 
threats to the aeintenenoe of our own export markets in 
that eree.     The enolent mercantile fallaoy that en 
industrial exporting nation should strive to iapede 
the industrialization of its overseas markets was 
ridiculed end exploded neerly 200 yeara ago by Adam 
Smith:  but like mistaken theories,  thie one dies 
herd.* 
Breden not only had  ideas as to how the implementation 
of Latin Aaerloen Industrie Use t ion should ooour, but wea 
adamant about ita being done e oertein way.    Ha felt that 
United States  businessmen  should make  investments  in Latin 
Aaarioa and not the United Stetea of Aserioa.    In abort 
Braden was against foreign aid ae e means to induotrielisa 
the nations to the south.    Aserioen texpayere ehould not 
have to fund auoh a venture.    He edded enother objeetion 
oooaon to those who protect foreign eid, thet the United 
States oennot buy friendehip ebroed through -Dollsr Diplon- 
•oy.-    The point wee made thet giving eoaetbing for nothing 
la done et the oost of losing respeot. 
speaking in fevor of privete enterprise, Brsden oited 
the Mexico Oity Oonferenoe of 1945 ee en exesple of Letin 
Aaarioan republics, in concert, epproving the prosotion of 
locals involving freedom of volition end opportunity end the 
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-encouragement  of private  enterprise,   elimination of the 
excesses of eoononlo nationaliam end assurenoe of just sod 
equitable treatment to foreign capital, MDSgoaeat sad 
6 
skills."      Bra den went on to say that in the United States 
private enterprise is the cornerstone to liberties and 
implied that Latin Aaerioa will ezperienoe a gxeeter degree 
of independence by adopting these sane eoononlo standards 
and it oust be done with the help of the United states, 
not by giving or landing foreign aid but by allowing pri- 
vate enterprise  from the United States to initiate indus- 
try in Latin Aaerioa.    Braden went on to aay that investors 
in Latin Aaerioa should be forewarned, that eventuelly 
their property,  in all likelihood, would be repetrieted, 
which ia to say that the government of the Letin Aneriean 
oountry would take over the induatry and would reiaburee 
the owner.     Ideally it would not involve oonfieostion or 
exproprietion.     Braden pointed out that foreign investaent 
in the United States helped the finenoiel development of 
thia oountry.    Eventually all foreign enterpriee wee 
repatriated and without the United Statee loaing frienda 
7 
among nations. 
During a speech in 1946 Braden deaoribed hineelf es e 
Jetteraonian Deaoorat while diaouaeing Inter-Aaerioan 
•rbitration.    He was in agreeaent with the ldeel thet 
■government is bast whioh governs ls.st- snd ha naturally 
fsrored a laiaaaa falra governaental approach to buaineaa. 
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Hi went on to show  that with the help of the various arbi- 
tration associations private enterprise hes prospered end 
baa advanced the Jeffersonian ideal showing that business 
oan remain virtually aloof from the  encroachment of gov- 
ernment controls.     He referred to arbitration as a lubri- 
oant that prevents government end business from oreeting 
8 
friction.      On the  same evening that Breden delivered this 
speeoh he wee presented  with the  Western  Hemisphere  Com- 
oeroial Arbitration Award.    On the introduction he wee 
referred to ea the  "eminent end distinguished pioneer in 
the organization  of oommeroial arbitration in the Western 
9 
Hemisphere."      It would not be many years before Spruillo 
Braden would beoome president of the American Arbitration 
iasooiation. 
Some of the other  speeches during Spruille Brad en's 
tenure ea Aaaiatant Seoretery of Stete oonoerned the gen- 
eral aree of peeoe.    In e redio broedoeat eerly in Janu- 
ary 1946 Breden epoke on "Our loter-Aeerloan Polioy."   He 
aade the point thet the United Statea polioy toward latin 
Aaerloa waa essentially the same a a our world polioy.    "We 
know that we oan only have regional aeourity in a aeoure 
•nd peaceful world." °    In oonjunotion with thie he aaid it 
MS paramount that wa enoourage indiridual freedoa end 
lapreeentatlve government in oppoaition to tyrannioel end 
arbitrary government.    During thie radio broadoeet Breden 
-poke in favor of foreign .id whioh he o.lled -oollabor.tion 
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for autu.1 benefit."    He explained that by Ming foreign 
aid the United States would be helping e notion raise hex 
standard of living or improving health; in return the 
United State* would ezpeot to be eble to work more oloeely 
with that  country which la no longer quite ee dependent ee 
prariouely.    He went on to say that thie attitude ateea from 
his oontinued faith In the  "Good Neighbor Policy" with eeoh 
neighbor interacting with the other, eeoh eernlng respect 
and eelf-respsot which reinforoes the need to honor ogree- 
aanta and oblige tiona.        When Brad an spoke approvingly of 
foreign aid he aeeoed to be speaking wore ee Aaeletent Seo- 
retary of State rather than ea Sprullle Breden in the light 
of his "Latin American Industrialisation" esssy disonsssd 
above, whioh he published in his own nose later in the yeer. 
On February 13,  1946 Breden delivered en address in 
Hew Tork Oity in whioh he reiterated hia viewa of the redio 
broadest.    He spoks in positive terns of the effioeoy of 
foreign old, sdding thst this suet inoluds s oultursl end 
social uplifting of the Letin nationa beeeuee they generelly 
•spire to such advanoeaent.    He osllsd this ettitude 
■altruiatio sslf-intersst."       By wsy of sxplsnstion he 
showed that with a selfless handout of sid snd ths subse- 
quent wising of standard, in Lstin Aserioa the found.tion. 
of eeourity sre being strengthened on both sidss with ths 
economic,  sooisl, snd oultursl fooslifting of these coun- 
tries."   it is difficult to bsli.v. thst Brsden ..id s»d 
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Mint these words but perhape he again a poke a a the Aaaia- 
taot Seoretary of State and not aa himself. 
Barly in Maroh Sprullle Bradan talked of the lnportenoe 
of cultural relations programs and the exchange of studentB 
•nd professors,  stating:     "For governments that repreaent 
■nd serve peoples oannot possibly collaborate in harmony if 
the peoples themaelvBB misunderstand and mistrust one 
another."        He pointed out that during the aid die of the 
twentieth oentury international relations no longer depended 
solely upon heads of state but upon peoples ea well. 
On the prerious dsy, Maroh 1, 1946, Breden apoke on 
the oooaaion of a dinner for Wendell L. WiUkle ewerde for 
Negro Journalise.    It was the tine when separete but equal 
Mia equal and Sprullle Braden spoke ea a liberal.    During 
his addreas Braden showed thet the tern liberel had of late 
been misused.     He ssid thst diotstorshipe bad applied the 
tern -liberal" to their own goyernnente.    He then went on 
to say that it was not sorely ooinoidenoe that etymology 
connected the words "liberaliee," "liberality- end  -liberty." 
He aaid that a free eooiety enhanced liberelias and oreeted 
• -apiritual magnanimity and tolerenoe, en outgoing gene- 
16 
roalty toward one's fellow man." 
Bradan went on to equate freedo. within . society to 
. peaceful society.     Brsdsn's equation wee dependent upon 
freedce of information so that the public can beooee end 
Benin informed.    Liberelies end freedce of inforeation 
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go hand in hand,  OM perpetuating the other.    Braden vent 
so f» as t0 MV tliat if freedom of information were uni- 
versally practiced tyranny would oone to an end and world 
wide peaoe would reign.    Ho oharged the Journalists of the 
world with the responsibility of keeping the public inforaed 
so that the tomorrows night be freer and more  liberal. 
Braden's  speech seemed  somewhat  idealistic and  slightly 
naive.    He did not remember that one of the drawbacks of 
freedom is the right to remain ignorant which makes access- 
ibility to information lass than the polltloel oure-all 
Braden suggested. 
On several occasions during his addreaa Spruille 
Braden made referanoa to Wendell Villkle'a "one world" 
concept.    Ha referred to that ideal aa a "highly praotioel 
18 
objeotire."       In future year a he would not spssk so kindly 
of "one world" or other libersl phrases end institutions. 
Three weeks later Braden spoke on the topio "Purpose- 
ful Peaoe."    Ha aaid that the United Statea should tsks 
the initiative around the world in bringing about peeoe 
beoauae democraoy by lta nature proaulgatee peaoe.    He 
wont on to suggest that the United Hationa be given the 
clout to enforoe a uniraraal peaoe, aaying that the United 
States intended to aupport that body to ite fullest.    Later 
on during the addr.se, Braden refuted oritioa and defended 
the view that the United Statea wea not at preaent orer- 
aaalous in ita pursuit of granting eiril righto end 
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individual liberties at the expense of other worthy goals. 
In the following years Braden was to speak less end less of 
individual freedoms. 
Once Spruille Braden left the State Depirtaent, he end 
his wife Maria pondered whether it would be wise to return 
to Chile.    They were both in agreement that they in their 
future should reside in Hew York.    Braden made a living 
doing various things during that tine.    He eerned en income 
as a lecturer and as a consultant to several large corpo- 
rations.    He was even asked to head a United States dele- 
gation to Canada for an informal dlsoussion of Cenadien- 
Aaeriosn political and eoonomic problems in Europe and the 
Far East.    Braden published his memoirs in 1971, delineating 
the political leaninga of the Amsriocn delegetee to the ^ 
oonferenoe and lieting himself among those on the right. 
The oonferenoe took place in June of 1951 and Braden wrote 
of it from a perspective of nearly twenty yeera.    Csn we 
trust Braden 'a atatament that in 1951 he stood on the 
right?   it is important to evaluate hie epeeohee end writ- 
ings during that time so aa to underatand hie political 
stanoe. 
On July 26, 1949, Braden apoke at Colgate Univereity. 
Tha topio waa similar to the one he developed while in the 
State Department.     It concerned tha Industrislisstion of 
istin America.    The mama attitude waa taken aa in tha former 
article concerning the virtues of private inveetment over 
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f0ZCigo aid to Latin America in the induatrlalisation of 
tin southern rapublioa.     The differanoa this tiaa was the 
strength of the words used in oritioiam of the than cur- 
rent polioy.    Ha waa oritioal of the millions of dollars 
that were spent abroad fox foreign aid while aid for some 
Aaarlosn problems want undelivered.    Ha seemed bitter whan 
he said,  "Certainly* with the world in ita desperate soo- 
noaio and political straits,  this is no tine for our gov- 
ernaent to dash forth in pursuit of Utopia...." 
He than goes  on to oritioisa  liberalism.     "We Ameri- 
cana, sre innately optimistic and, therefore, slways ready 
to try aomething new, aapaoially if it pronises refora or 
a speedier approaoh to tha Billanium."        finally Braden 
■scribed a maoho quality to business whan ha suggested 
private antarpriaa will overoome gorarnaantal intarven- 
tion.    "It is ay baliaf that tha Majority of Aaeriean 
business leaders a till have too auoh virility to be lad 
•stray by tha dabilitating paternalism of government guar- 
23 
■Dteea." 
In 1949, Bradan became praaidant of tha American Arbi- 
tration Assooiation.    Ha was aakad by tha aasooistlon if ha 
would become ita praaidant.    Ha aaid ha would under tha oon- 
dition that some prooadural changes would ba aada.    These 
changes war a aada and Bradan aooeptsd tha post.       Brsdsn 
wrote several article, on arbitration whila pre.idsnt of 
I 
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tin association.     He wrote mostly on a branch of the arbi- 
tration known as the I.B.R.C. or the  International Business 
Relations Counoil which bad bean founded In 1947.    The 
international branob worked on the same prlnolple aa the 
Amerioan Association except that it was on an internetionel 
basis.    Whenever e business dispute eziated between two 
parties arbitration oould be sought out and either one or 
three arbitora would be eent in to settle the dispute.    The 
arbitors would  consist of volunteers  from ell walka of 
life.    In moat oountriea erbitreted judgmenta were oonaidered 
legally binding.     Perbepe the moat important aapeot of arbi- 
tration wea that it  was a epeedy, relotively uncoatly and 
Just prooeaa.     The non-profit orgeniaetion would oharge a 
standard rate of 1 peroent of the erbitratad amount, whiob 
often meant payment would be but e faw dollara.    Arbitra- 
tion both abroad and domeetioally became very popular ainoe 
It preoluded lengthy end ooatly oourt aettlementa.    An 
outside virtue of internetionel erbitretion was that it 
showed that doing buaineaa with Amerioena waa no longer 
risky.25   Arbitretion ie even mentioned in the United Nations 
oharter in Artiole 33 in referenoe to nettling dieputea. 
Bxaden wrote tbet tne United Netiooa waa in 1949 oonaider- 
iog the edoption of erbitretion prinoiplee for the inter- 
national lew oomrnieeion of the General Aaeembly. 
in 1951 Spruille Breden entered e new Una of work aa 
chairman of the Anti-Crime Committee of Hew York City.    He 
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bad been asked by several prominent oitizens who were 
civic-minded.     Brad en  protested  aaylng be had  DO orime- 
fighting experience.    They oountered that he hed often 
spoken of the breakdown of morality aa a threat to national 
security.    Before Braden aooepted he made e list of "guid- 
ing principles" for the organization.    When the committea 
approved then Braden aooepted the post of chairman.    Braden 
BIN the purpoae of the oommittee aa a wetohdog of the oourta 
and the polioe in their handling of the law and the admin- 
istration of Justice.     The New York City Anti-Crime Committee 
stayed in existence 5* yeers before its funds were dried up 
* 27 
and it oould no longer function. 
In an artiole titled  "More Dengeroua Than Spies," whioh 
appeared in Readers Digest.  Braden ahowed that the extent of 
crime and corruption in the United Stetea had a demorelislng 
effeot on her citizenry.    Furthermore,  reporta of New York 
policemen involved in oriminal activities depreoieted Amer- 
ica's credibility sbrosd.    Prom this Breden suggested that 
the oommunists might be baoking organized orime: 
Stalin oould not find a apeedier,  ■"•jrg.J'fi'Sli 
the democracies than by subsidizing «"Jg JJ 0fitr 
politioisns.    Actually,  since H»f •**J±££i 
countries how olossly the »«£«•",?8m*25K 5 
work together,  I sometimes wonder if *hen 
SoT""fo6 
not in Some meaeurs inciting theee vermin to Jj^JJ 
our system of law and order.    »* ^^" ^^IS 
be so,... this scum and the ••*"»£* *?u!P* 
officers ere among the Kremlin's best elliea. 
Ill 
In the following years Braden would be numbered among those 
who saw a ooBnunlst threat around  every oorner.    The above 
atateaent is merely an example of hie qualifications. 
On October  13,  1952 Sprullle Braden delivered en 
address to several press  associations in Chicago,   Illinois. 
He spoke on a very familiar topic, that of non-intervention. 
He defined it to the preaa in the aame terme he had used 
throughout his diplomatic oareer ainoo the policy was 
adopted at the Montevideo Conference.    Breden did take 
opportunity to articulate a new twist on the term "Inter- 
rention" and at the aame time to take enother slap at for- 
eign aid.    He oalled foreign eid another example of American 
intervention.     It seemed that whenever the United Stetes 
loaned or granted money ebroad she elso felt aha had the 
right to aupervise its implementation» teohnically this 
was intervention.    Braden went on to sey that United States 
intervention was proportionate to the money distributed to 
the nations around the world.    He then quoted George Wash- 
ington on the topic of foreign eidt 
•Tis folly in one nation to look for "£»*«;£;*, 
favor from another | that it auet £*****■ £rtl°° 
oust cure, which a  just pride ought to diaeara. 
Poreign aid, Braden aaid, caused in the paoplea receiving 
it a diaintagration of pride and moral- which tranalated^ 
l>to a reaentment of the donor netion-th. United States. 
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Ironically  just five months later Sprullle Braden was 
to sound an urgent alarm under the roof of Dertmouth Col- 
lege.    He said that currently there had been e  "Hate the 
U.S.A." campaign  going on throughout the Western Hemis- 
phere, oalling it a  "conspiracy to destroy the United 
states," and that it emanated from the Kremlin.        In hia 
speech he gave  several  legitimate  example a of communist 
aotivities in Latin America;  other examples aeemed like 
allegations and neither oould it be proven to have had a 
Soviet origin.     The irony in thia speeoh occurs with the 
reoolleotion of the speeoh previously oited.    He mentioned 
that the United  States had brought about e feeling of resent- 
nent by Latin Americana due to her monetary intervention. 
just five months later he attributed thia resentment to 
comnunist influenoe.    In this seoond speeoh he doea sake 
a connection with the thesis of the former speeoh when he 
said the -"give swsy'  progrems, unless exeouted with ""i^ 
BUD wisdom, may promote rather than diminish oommunism." 
He made a weak oonneotion between the two theaea but we are 
left with the impression that Latin Amerioen reeentment of 
the United States has two distinct sources of origin and 
perhapa each is dependent upon the eudienoe gathered. 
Braden has been called a Social Dsrwinist,        and in 
• continuation of the previous quote Breden went on to ssy 
about the communists,   "Inferentislly they promise an eoo- 
noaio equality which is unattainable, since inequslity is 
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a coefficient  
of a11 !**••" Braden  semis  to be implying 
bare that there is a natural hierarchy In life which is 
the basis for  Social  Darwinism.     Those moat  suited for 
survival will adopt and their fitness to their environment 
will manifest  itself in the  accumulation of wealth.    At 
the base of Soolal Darwinian ia Capitalism and it is this 
that communism  rejects  as  the  prime human motivator.     Per- 
sonal wealth makes men unequal and a sharing of the wealth 
frees men to work for the oommon good.    If communism appeals 
to latin Amerioana it ia because of the combination of the 
United States flaunting of the dollar at the expense of 
latin Aaerioan llbertiea.     Braden was right| latin Amerioan 
hoatility to the United State a had two oauses,  (1) the 
resentment oreated by large suma of money apent in latin 
America and  (2) that oreatad by oommunlat propaganda, whioh 
found the time ripe to help create an anti-United Statee 
sentiment. 
In Auguat and September of 1956, Spruilla Braden pub- 
lished articlaa in the Ijggjgj B™°i°g gB£ •nd *■ 
Amerioan Mercury.    Ha wrote on the same theme, foreign aid 
i> each article.    The second article, -Billiona for Blun- 
dera," waa larger and included the earlier,  -Why ft* United 
lotions Bureaucrats Dole Out Amerioan Foreign Aid?"    He 
noted that the United States is rirtually a unilateral 
funder of the United Hationa and that her moniee are dia- 
peraed among the needy nations snonymously through the 
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pioefl of the United Netione.    Some of the netlone receiv- 
ing United Stetee oepital through thie organization ere 
oonBuniet oountriee.     Braden found thie absurd end sug- 
gested that the United Statee take cognizance of the feot 
that it had epent,  over the peat ten years, $55 billion in 
34 
foreign aid. He oontended that the Aoerioen tex peyer 
should not have to beer the reeponalbllity for the welfare 
of the world.    In fact, he eaid, the teek Anericena had been 
asked to undertake would be financially iapoeaibJe  to 
aohieve.    He pointed out that the $55 billion epent orer 
the prerioua ten yea re waa equal to the  net worth of the 
thirteen largeat citiea in the United Statea.    It ia aig- 
nificant that the United Statea goea many hillione of 
dollar I into debt ennually without the burden of foreign 
aid.    The inaiatenoe on giving out noniea to foreign ooun- 
triee, which only aervea to oreete reeentnent ebroad, oan 
only be aotireted by nadneaa or by "nieguided ideelieta, 
do-gooders,  oollectiYiate,  aoc ia lie te... with e eprinkling 
of ooaauoiete," operating within the United Stetee gorern- 
aent.35    Juat aa Braden could aee oonaunieta oper.ting in 
the Stete Dep.rto.ent when he wea Aeaietent Seoretery, he 
oould elao aee the- aa haying gained influence on foreign 
policy, deetroying Amerioa from within. 
Speaking at the Aaerioen coelition of petriotio 
sooietiee in Waahington on January 31. 1958 Braden brought 
God and country together in an ett.ok on foreign .id.    He 
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said "that the United States la  'dinobeying God's will* by 
36 
its eooDomlo help to other countries and peoples."        Bra- 
den not only spoke aa an enemy of foreign aid but as a 
proponent of a neo-iaolatlonism.    During the 1940'a Spruille 
Braden had battled dictators and in the fifties he became 
an outspoken enemy of a foreign ideology,  communism, although 
in reference to the mid-for ties he stated he knew little 
about communism at the time.    After going to Washington as 
Assistant Seoretary of State and being allowed to languiah 
at that high post and eventually being edged out of the 
Department, Braden aaw it aa the produot of the inaidioua 
ooamunieta who had  the ear of the Preaident and Seoretary 
of State.    He would never come to oonoeive of himself as 
aa anachronism aa auggeated by George Blanketen, when 
Braden doggedly puraued World War II well efter ita oon- 
olusion.    The fact that Braden oeassd his attacks on fascist 
dictators after his stay in the  State Department, aave one, 
Juan Peron, who oooaaionally emerged in apeeohea, lndioates 
that ha took the struggle against Peron peraonally aa if 
It were a case of demagogue veraua demagogue, who was the 
oore macho?    When he waa more or leaa forced froa the State 
Department he felt the need to alert the nation about the 
ooamunists from whom he had learned, firat hand, their 
patnicioua nature.    Braden felt that what they had don. to 
bin oould not go unpunished end  ao he beoame a Paul Revere 
warning of a new peril in red. 
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in the 1960*s Braden'a attack on ooaouniam took dif- 
ferent forma and by the end of the deoade he had faded Into 
virtual oblivion.    After the revolution in Cuba produoed e 
coBBuniet dlotatorahlp there, Braden expressed his views as 
to what  should be  done  about  It  to the Long  Island Federa- 
tion of Women'a Clubs on May 20,  I960.    Besides some of the 
■ore obvious reoommendetions  like breaking diplomatic rela- 
tions, he foresaw the building of Russian missile pads and 
submarine bases and suggested, 
We must give full finanoial and military aid to 
responsible Cuban groups now, both in Cubs and in 
exile.    They are ready to organise armed opposition 
to the Cestro regime.    The Cubana will free themselves, 
if the U4S.A.  promptly will give them the means to do 
the Job.37 
In essence Braden outlined the oonduct for the Bay of Piga 
invasion whloh was to follow a year later. 
A few days before the abortive Bay of Pigs incident 
the Stete Deportment issued publication 7171 of the Inter- 
Aaerio.n Seriea 66.    It waa simply titled -Cuba- but became 
known ae the  -White Paper.-    Publiehed by the Kennedy admin- 
lBtration, the White Paper placed blame on former Cuban 
President Pulgencio Batista as having created conditiona in 
Cuba ao as to make revolution an aooepteble eltemetlve to 
that of the then present conditions.    The demorelised etete 
of the Cuban military,  as a result of Batiafe cynical 
treatment of government,  precluded success egeinst the 
coBBuniet foroes who were fighting for e ceuse.       m «'«'* 
i 
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the "White Paper" wee a   justification of what the United 
States had planned to do with the Bey of Pigs invasion.    It 
8 Baying "we are Just undoing what Batista had allowed 
to be done." 
pulgenoio Batista,  in exile, took exoeption to the 
•White Paper" and published in 1964 The Growth and Decline 
of the Cuban Ronublio.    In his book, Batista quoted a apeaoh 
by Braden made a month and a half after the issuance of the 
-White Paper."    The speeoh was before the Cuban Cbaaber of 
Cosoerce in the United States.    Braden characterised the 
"White Paper" as   "one of the most indefensible documents 
I hare ever seen issued by a  presumably responsible foreign 
office."39    Brsden went on to point out that Cuba had 
enjoyed,  prior to 1959,   "the largeat par ospita income of 
any latin Amerioan Republic"        The  "White Paper" bad 
described eoonomic conditions as being poor as a result 
of Batista's second presidency/1    To this Brsden retorted, 
The White Paper's direct and implied ***£**£** 
aTtrthe poErty end bad •;«2g0
oo;JJ^S!o£«t« Cuba, prior to the coming of Oaatro, "e "■??ur" 
and evidence the aocialistio P"J«*}o» f "J. 
drafter a.... The  beat that ****** £ 0l\w4«- that it displays suoh Iterance and ^okorunoar 
standing as to explain in oonaidarabla WTgJg0 
bunglini of theoetastrophe in Bahfa da Coohinos 
(Bay of Piga).4* 
On April 1,  1961 Juet two days before the "Whit. 
*per" was publianed, the «- Tork Timea_ revealed in an 
•rticle on the John Birch Society that Spruille Braden wa. 
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a oember of that ultra conservative organisation.    Inoluded 
in the Tinea of that date was a pamphlet that Hated the 
members of the  John Blroh Society's  council.    The  Hat 
inoluded Spruille Braden and an explanation of the coun- 
cil's funotion.    It was oreated  (1) to ehow the atature of 
the society,   (2) to keep Robert Weloh, Jr.,  (founder end 
head of the aooiety) informed, and  (5) to provide a euooeesor 
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when Weloh died. 
Braden described Weloh as   "a man eonvinoed, as I am, 
that communism is a present danger that should be exposed.... 
He is trying to show the individual how he oan help through 
individual action."        The Mew York Times published several 
•rticles on the Society on April 1, 1961.    One of these 
articles reached the front page.    It was the oocssion when 
the John Blroh Society called for the impeaohment of Chief 
Justice Earl Warren and  statsd that Warren had  -voted 92 per- 
cent of the time in favor of oommunlsts nnd subversives 
since joining the court." 
in July of 1961 the Time* published an article that 
revealed e rift between Braden and Weloh.    Bradsn wss 
critical of Welch's campaign to uncover and classify oom- 
sunist sympathiser-,  i.e.  liberals.    He felt it wss more 
important and more easily accomplished to uncover the 
-pattern rather than the individuals- snd expose it to the 
46 
public 
119 
In 1964 it was disclosed by the Tines that Bradan 
bad quit tba aoolety aoma two years previously.    Ha indi- 
cated ha disputed aoma of the things Weloh had said.    Waloh 
called former "President Eisenhower e dedioated oonaoioua 
agent of the communist conspiracy,"      whioh Bradan oould 
not aooept.    Perhaps the real problem waa atatad by Bradan 
elsewhere in the artiole.     "I don't want to be a diraotor 
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of anything I don't  direct," he aaid.        That would seem to 
be oonaistent with Bradan'a independent nature. 
It is intereating to note here that Bradan does not 
make a single mention of hia aaaooiation with the John Biroh 
Society in the length of hia Memoir a.    la it an indication 
that ha waa not proud of hia aaaooiation with the aooiety? 
Or is it a bad memory aa waa hia role aa Aaaiatant Secre- 
tary of State when ha waa a director who oould not direct. 
Perhaps a partial anawer to the above queationa may 
be derived from a atatement made in piplomata and Dema- 
gogues, which waa publiahed in 1971.    Bradan deeoribed e 
situation that waa oraatad in Yalparaiao, Chile, when he 
waa a youth.    It dealt with the aftermath of an earthquake. 
The quake had smashed open the ^^J^g1!?;! 
and a horde of oriminala waa **^***Znt, 
Civilian offioiala ware anything ^"g&g* 
But a young captain of the port, Oomndjr Gomes 
CarreHo, wis equal to the oooaalon.    He toouraa 
martial law in the moat asTere *♦*««» "J^JJJ'J.id 
it applied with deadly •««°*lT".»-"ll'ltl Situation 
that Captain Carre*) took adv«*•«••?-JSJ^Sml- 
to kill off a number of wellJ»°"° !"£r£de crime 
nala.    However that say be, ha oertainiy ■■« 
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unhealthy in Valparaiso after the earthquake.... 
We  could  use   such a  hardheaded  man ID  aorae of our 
oitiaa today.*9 
This atataoant indioatea  that alooat a daoade after 
bia departure  from  the  John Birch Society  Spruille  Braden 
was not ashamed to aapouse anti-liberal and ultra- 
conservative sentiments.    All this indicates that Braden 
was not disenchanted with the goale of the Society but only 
with the route chosen by which to achieve them as ha Indi- 
cated in the Tlmea article.    What did alienate Braden wae 
that he had no voice in formulating policy direction} this 
must have left him with a feeling of impotence aomething 
akin to the frustration ha felt in the Department. 
Braden remained active until the mld-eixtiea attaoking 
liberals and communists.     Often his themes dealt with 
morality and immorality but along the aame lines.    He 
called "for a moral revolution - and wrote about "immorality 
and ooamuniam," msking the atatement,   "I have acquired quite 
an experlenoe in fighting a variety of demons,"      whioh is 
not inoonsistent with the title of thia monograph. 
The last publio statement by Spruille Braden appeared 
in the form of an assay written for the New York limes snd 
titled "A Raturn to Morality." Writing in 1973 at the age 
of 79 Braden oontinued to attaok oommuniam aa the greateat 
of .11 immoralitiaa. Ha called for the termination of the 
ever-expanding inflation that keeps America from becoming 
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as defensible as possible.    Though the ertiole itself specks 
little of morality,       this and the other assays oonoernlng 
the BSBS topio of morslity enooursge one to believe that 
Braden's prsoooupation with morality was a personal plea for 
justice as he felt himself a wronged man.    If one reada 
Braden's Memoirs he is struck with the fact that Braden ia 
never "wrong" and because of that we are tempted to believe 
that Braden was an unfulfilled demagogue. 
122 
Chapter YIII—Pootnotea 
^oae Tioente Pepper,  I Aoouee Bradap, edited by Editore 
HontalTO  (Trujillo City, Dominican Republio, 1947), p. 30. 
2jeaua de Galfndez,  The Bra of Trujllloi    Domlnioan 
Dictator, edited by Ruaaal Pitaglbbon (Tuoaont    fbe Uni- 
versity of Arizona  Press,  1973), p. 244. 
3Ibld., PP.  235, 243-244. 
*Spruille  Braden,   "Latin  American  Industrialization and 
Foreign Trade," in Industrialisation in Latin America, 
edited by Lloyd J. Hughiett  (New Tor let    Mooraw-Hill Book 
Co., ino., 1946), p. 488. 
5Spruille Braden,   "Private Enterpriae in the Develop- 
aent of the Americas, - Department of State Publication 2640, 
Inter-American Seriee No.  32,  194b, pp. z,  5, b, 9. 
6Spruille Braden,   "Notee for Private Enterpriae," Modern 
Mexico. Nov.  1946, p.  9. 
7Ibid.. pp.  9, 8. 
8Spruille Braden,   "Arbitration in Inter-Amerioan Affairs, 
Department of State Bulletin.  Oot. 27, 1946, pp. 778-779. 
9james S. Caraon,   "Weetern Hemisphere Commercial Arbi- 
tration Award Preaented to the Honorable Spruille Braden," 
The Arbitration Journal, Pall, 1946, p. 296. 
10Spruille Braden and Ellie 0. Brigge,   "Our Inter-Amerioan 
Policy," Department of State Publloatlon 2456, Inter- 
Aoerioan Series No. 28, p.  lb. 
UIbid., p.  16. 
12Spruille Braden,   "Our Poreign Policy end Its UndarXying 
Principles end  Ideals," Department of State Bulletin, 
Feb. 24,  1946,  p.  296. 
13Ibld. 
14SPruill. Braden,   "International ;
nd«B£^n« 'K&n, 
a Cultural Relations Program," ^psrtment of Stete Bulletin, 
Maroh 10, 1946,  p.  397. 
123 
15Ifci4..,  P.  396. 
■^Spruille  Brad en,   "Freedom  of Information—A Check  to 
irresponsible Power," Department of State Bulletin, 
Mar oh 10-  1946, p.  392. 
17Ibid., pp. 393-394. 
18Ibid.,  p.  394. 
■^spruille Braden,   "Purposeful Peaoe," Department of 
State Bulletin, March 31,  1946, pp. 535-537. 
20Memoira,  pp.  382-383. 
21Spruille Brad an,   "Diligenoe and Thrift," Congressional 
Digest, May,  1950,  p.  149. 
22 
23 
24 
Ibid. 
'ibid.,  p.  153. 
Memoirs,  p. 398. 
25Spruille Braden,   "Arbitration Paya," Christian Solenoe 
Monitor Magazine Section, Sept. 17, 1949, p. 2. 
26Spruille Braden,   "International Arbitrationi    Umpire 
for World Trade," United Nations World,  Nov.  1949, PP. 52, 
50. 
27Memoira,  pp.  384-385,  395. 
28Spruille Braden,   "More Dangerous Than Spies," Readers 
Digest, June 1951,  pp. 6-7. 
29Spruille Braden,  "Non-Interventiont    The Conduot of 
International Ralationa," vital gjajghaj of the Day. 
Oct. 13,  1952,  pp.  102-104. 
50Spruilla Braden,   "The Communiat Threat i» *h« i""10"' 
The Enemy at Our Portala," vital Sneeofaea of the Day, 
May 1, 1953,  p. 432. 
31Ibid.,  pp.  437,  436. 
124 
52Robert  F.  Delaney,   "DiplomatB and Demagogues:    The 
Menoira of Spruille Braden," The Library Journal Book 
Rnview 1971 (New Yorki R. R.  Bowlcer Company, 1972), p. 97. 
^Braden,   "Comouniat  Threat,"  p.  436. 
54Spruille Brad en, "Why Let United Nations Bureaucrats 
Dole Out American Aid?" Saturday Evening Poet, August 11, 
1956, p. 10. 
55Spruille Brad en,   "Bllliona for Blunder a," The American 
Meroury, Sept.  1956,  pp.  23,  24,  27. 
56»»ood'B Will'  and Foreign Aid," Amerloa,  Feb. 15, 1958, 
p. 561. 
?7GoDgressional Digest.  Nor.  I960, p. 287. 
58"Cuba," Department of State Publication 7171, Inter- 
Anerioan Series No.  bb, April,  I9bi, p. *. 
39Fulgenoio Batiata,  The growth and Decline of the Cuban 
Republic, tranalated by Bias M. Rocafort  (Now Yorki    The 
Bavin-Ada ir Co.,  1964),  p. 103. 
40Ibid.,  p.  269. 
41"Cuba," Depertinent of State Publication 7171, P.  2. 
42Batiata, Growth and Deoline,  pp.  268-269. 
43-Pamphlet Listing Birch Society Counoil ia Releaaed," 
New York Time a, April 1,  1961,  p.  5. 
44"Saleaman of the Right," New York Time a, April 1,  1961, 
p. 5. 
45John D. Morria, "Birch Unit Puahee Drive on Warren," 
New York Time a.  April 1,  1961,  P»  !• 
46Pater Kihss,   "Birch Society Building File- on leading 
1 Liberals'," New York Times. July 7, 19ol, p. y. 
47"Bradan Diaoloaee He Quit Biroh Post," New York Ila»a. 
March 19,   1969,   p.   26. 
125 
48Ibid, 
*9M8JD0iT8,   P.   20. 
5°Spruille  Braden,   "Immorality and  Communlam:    Reapect 
in Foreign Relations," Yltal Spaeohoa of the Day. April 1, 
1965, P. 365. 
51Spruilla Braden,   "A Return to Morality," Hew York Time a. 
April 15, 1973, See 4, p.  17. 
126 
SUMMARY 
Spruille Braden bad always bean euooeaeful in business? 
io the early 1930'a he attempted to teat hie fortune In 
diplomacy.    Braden had an excellent background ooneernlng 
Latin American life, haying spent many years there.    Once 
given the opportunity to perform for hia government he 
proved to be a valuable asset.     In 1935 Braden was appointed 
ambassador-at-large to the Ohaoo Peaoe Conferenoe in Buenos 
Aires.    When the three arduoua years were completed Braden 
reoeived much of the oredit for keeping the oonferenoe 
together and bringing about peaoe at a time when the oon- 
ferenoe seemed it would fail.    The little known Chaoo War 
fought between small Paraguay and Bolivia loomed e far 
more significant event than it may have seemed at the time. 
Nazi Germany  began  its  aggressive  designs  leading to World 
War II before the Chaoo Peaoe Paot was signed.    It was Ger- 
many's hope that the peaoe oonferenoe would dissolve and hoa- 
tiiities would renew, with Argentina, Chile and Braail Join- 
ing in the fray and eaaentially oaating the Weetern Hemiaphere 
into chaos.     The peaceful reaolution of the Chaoo Peaoe Con- 
ferenoe put an end to Germany's hope. 
Braden'a next assignment was »a ambassador to Colombia! 
there he enoountered an airline etaffed and operated by 
Germane.    He sensed a great danger as the Panama Canal waa 
wy near.    Braden diaoovered some very important information 
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about the airline,  that 84 peroent of it waa owned by Fan 
Aoerioan.    After many months of dogged work Braden brought 
about the removal of the Germane from the airline.    The Ger- 
mans were replaced by United States pilote.    The Panama 
Canal waa  aafe. 
Spruille Braden next became ambassador to Cuba where 
among other thinga he waa oredited with helping to bring 
about en honest presidential election end preventing a 
ooup d'etat that would have nullified it.    Braden also 
did something in Cuba that epoke aignifioantly of hia ohar- 
aoter.    A oonvioted epy wee ordered to his death by Braden 
when Preaident Fulgenoio Batieta asked hia to deoide the 
man's fate.    Auguat Inning waa the only epy exeouted in 
latin America during World War II.    During Braden'a atay 
in Cuba he seemed to reveal a new tough atyle of diplomacy, 
particularly with fellow United State a eitiaena.    He made it 
apparent that he wanted hia worde heeded. 
In the middle of 1945 Breden beoane the ambassador to 
Argentina where he deelt with a faeciat regime.    Individual 
righte had been dieoerded end freedome of preea and apeeoh 
bad been auppreeeed.     Spruille Breden informed Yioe-Preeident 
Per5*n that before the United Stetea oould do bualneaa with 
Argentina,  the  "et.te of aiege" would he v. to be lifted end 
other atipulatione had to be met.    The Argentine faaoiate 
complied, at le.-t partially, end Spruille Breden became a 
hero to Argentmeewho w.nted democracy reator.d.    Braden did 
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all he oould  to discredit the fasoista while et the same 
tine Per6n used smear tsotlos to defame Braden.    By Septem- 
ber 1945 Braden was recalled to Washington where he beoame 
Assistant   Secretary  of State for   Latin American Affaire. 
prom Washington he continued  his attaok on  Peron but  iron- 
ically Braden helped bring about hie election as President 
of Argentina. 
Spruille Braden gradually lost authority within the 
State Department and eventually retired in 1947 en embittered 
nan.    In the following yaare Braden refleoted as to what hap- 
pened to him in Washington.    Hs osme to the oonolualon that 
coamunists in ths State Department were reaponeible for hie 
politioel demise.     Spruille Brsdsn had had  the reputetion 
of being a progressive snd e liberal when he wee en ambaeea- 
dor.    In the 1950 's hs evolved into e etrong oritio of gov- 
ernment polioy snd a herald of insidioue oommunist oonspir- 
acies.    He became more snd more conservative and when the 
John Biroh Society was founded Breden wee made one of ite 
direotore.     He waa to quit the aooiety e few yeara later 
because he had no voioe in policy direction.    Thereofter 
Braden was oontent in continuing to write and apeek out 
about communism. 
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CONCLUSION 
Sprullle Bra den was a bona fide hero of World War II. 
He MBs instrumental In bringing about a settlement of the 
Chsoo dispute and In effeot uniting the hemisphere against 
the vagaries of chaos that would have resulted.    In Colombia 
he virtually fought alone but suooeeded in expelling Nazis 
from a Colombian airline that presented an immediate danger 
to the Panama  Canal and hence to the security of the Wes- 
tern Hemisphere.     Neither of these achievements by Braden 
were ever acknowledged in a perspective of "What would have 
happened had he failed?" and hence history has never given 
him the oredit he was due. 
When Brsden resigned from the State Department he was 
a frustratsd and disillusioned man.    He hsd been ordered 
from Argentina before his mission, as he saw it, had been 
completed.    He oould not see that he was perhapa beating 
a dead horse by pursuing World Wsr II beyond its oonolusion 
or that maybe he was engsging in a battle of personalitiea 
with 7ioe-Presidsnt Per&'n.    Brsden oontinued the battle 
in Waahlngton and when Peron was eleoted President of Argen- 
tina he became more and more an obacure figure In the State 
Department.     It seems certain that either or both of these 
reasons oontributsd to Brsden «s politioal downfall. 
Braden*a failure to aee these things shout himself 
oauaed bitterness within him end a ohange toward the far 
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right politically.    His sense of reality saw communists in 
every oorridor of the Stste Department who helped bring 
about his downfall.    To maintain this fallaoy and avoid the 
truth, Bradan spread the warning of the communist threat to 
the United States as lste as 1973.    Despite the results of 
hia failure to see the truth about himaelf Spruilie Bra den 
was a hero of the Seoond World War who did not reoelve the 
proper recognition and we must treat him like Sophooles1 
AJax who was remembered for what he was and not by the 
nature of his demise. 
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APPENDIX 
THE   NEW   YORK' TIMES,   TUESDAY.   OCTOBER   11,   19SS. 
Text of Award  Fixing th 
asset.: 10 TM N.« TMX T»U 
WASHINGTON,   Oct.   10.—Th» 
Btute  Department   gntf   out   the 
Irjt 0/ the arbitral award in  the 
Chaco at made in Buenoe Atree, 
\ Argentina, today, an fnttnwi: 
k  Th* underelgned plenipotentiary 
delegate*, reprcaentlng th* Preal- 
t.r-M of the Republic* of Argen- 
HM, Brazil, Chit*. United State* 
of America, Peru and Uruguay, 
authorized hy their reapcetlve Ex- 
ecutlvea with full power*, ara 
annexed to the pre*ent award, to 
wit: » 
Joi< Maria Cantllo, Mlnlitar for 
Foreign Affaire of the Argentine 
Republic; Ambaaaador Dr. Ial- 
doro Rule Moreno and Mlnlitar 
Dr. Pablo Santoa Munoz. repre- 
senting Hla Excellency. Dr. 
Roberto M. Ortlx, Prealdent of 
the Argentine Republic. 
Ambaaaador Dr. Jose de Paula 
Rodrlquea Alvea, representing Hla 
Excellency, Or. Oetullo Varga*. 
Preildent of the United States of 
Brazil; 
Ambaaaador Dr. Lula Barroa 
Borgono and T)r. Manuel Blnnchl, 
repreaenlmg Hla Excellency. Dr. 
Arturo Aleaaandrl. Prealdent of 
the Republic of Chile; 
Ambaaaador Sprullle Braden, 
representing Hla Excellency. 
Franklin D. Rooaevelt, Prealdent 
of the United Statea of America: 
Ambaaaador Dr. Felipe Barreda 
Lao* and Mlnlater Lula Fernan 
Clsneroa. reprcaentlng Hla Excel-, 
lency, General Oacar R. Ben**- 
vldea. Prealdent of the Republic 
of Peru; 
Ambuaador Eugenlo Martinez 
Thedy, reprcaentlng Hla Excel- 
lency, General Alfredo Balomlr. 
Prealdent of the Oriental P.epub- 
lle of Uruguay; 
Treaty Trovlalona Cited 
Conalderlnf 
That the treaty of peace, friend- 
ship and boundaries algned under 
'he auaplcea of the Peace Con- 
,,"'" ln Buenoa Alrea on Julv 
n, IMS, by the repreaentatlvea of 
"Olivia and Paraxuay, ratified In 
•ccordance with Article XI. pro- v|dea aa followa; 
"Article 2. The dividing line 
In the Chaco between Bolivia and 
Paraguay I Paraguay and Bolivia) 
will be that determined hy the 
Prealdenta of the Republic! of 
Argentina, Chile, United Statea of 
America. United Statea of llraill. 
Peru and Uruguay, In their ca- 
pacity aa arbitrator* In equity, 
who, acting ex aequo et hone), will 
glva their arbitral award In ac- 
cordance with thla and the follow- 
ing clauaea, 
" "A. The arbitral award will 
fix. the northern dividing line ln 
the Chaco In the zone eomprlacd 
between the line of the Peace 
Conference preaented May 27, 
IMS. and the Una of the Para- 
guayan counter-propoaal preeent- 
ed to the eonalderatlon of the 
Peace Conference June 2«, 193". 
from the meridian of Fort 2T of 
November, I.e., approximately 
meridian 61 degreea 55 mlnutea 
waat of Greenwich, to the eaatern 
limit of the zone,  excluding the 
littoral on th* VWMWgT R|v« 
aouth of the mouth of the River 
Otuqule or Negro. 
•■B. The arbitral award will 
likewise fix the weatern dlvld ng 
line In the Chaco b*WI« 
Plleomayo River and «"•'»«"• 
section of the meridian of Port 27 
of November. I.e.. approximately 
61 degree* 55 mlnutea we»t M 
Greenwich, with th* lin. of the 
•ward ln the north referred to in 
the prevlou* paragraph. 
■' 'C The aald line will not go 
on the Plleomayo River more to 
the eaat than Poio Hondo, nor to 
the weat further than any point 
on. the line which, j•tarllng from 
d'Orblgny. waa flx«d by the Neut- 
ral Military Commlaalon as Inter- 
mediary between the maximum 
position, reached by the bellige-r- 
rnt armlea at th* *u«pen*lon of 
fire on June 14. 4935.' 
Arbitrator* Will Pronounoe 
"Article 3. The .rbltrator. will 
pronounce, having heard the 
parties and according to their 
lnval knowledge and under.tand- 
Ing. taking Into consideration ne 
experience accumulated by the 
Peace Conference and the advice 
of the military advlarr. to that 
organization. 
x&tisrs 
"The alx Prealdenta of the re- 
public* mentioned In Article II 
have th* faculty of giving the 
award 'directly or by mean* of 
plenipotentiary delegate*"; and 
wlierea* th* alx Prealdenta have 
been requcated by th. Govern- 
ment*, of Paraguny and Bo IV -. 
to act aa arMlm'."" and hr.ve . - 
capted and. uaing tho rlfflrt con- 
ferred upon them by Artie- • 
of the above referre-. to .r -..y 
i  of Peace. Friendship anil ..ou- - 
arle*, have delegated their func- 
tion* as arbitrator, to the plcn-e 
Ipotentlarlea above mentioned. 
By Article 2 of the Treaty of 
Peace,, Friendship and round- 
arle* above referred to. Bolivia 
and Paraguay have established 
that the award .hall b. one o. 
equity, the arbitrator to act ex 
aequo «t bono: •• 
Partle* to Dl.put* Heard 
The partle*. In accordant* with 
the provision, of Article 3 
of the said treaty, have been 
heard In .pedal audience In 
which they each presented brief* 
accompanied by abundant doc- 
umentation: --—!■ 
An advlaory military eornmla. 
tlon ha. made an aerial photo- 
graphic aurvey and an Inspection ; 
Sf the terrain In l»e zones de- 
termined by the. treaty of July 1 21 1938, and ha* preaented ...e 
eo'rreapondlng «*WJ' ,_ «.vt 
Moreover, the ^«52«"KJ 
taken Into account he an «- 
a.«,i accumu nted by the . " •" 
mutual" .ecurlty and geographic , 
and economic necesstea. , 
Th, examination of thes- an.* 
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PARAGUAY-BOLIVIA BOUNDARY IS DETERMINED 
An arbitral award bv the Presidents of six American nations 
h.s finally ended the Chaco dispute. The r.cw frontier is abown 
bv the black line. Parap-.-.y holds the military pains of the rcce-. 
war but does not Ret a foothold in Bolivia's oil fields. 
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